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A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY 1
1 Every day over one million people are treated 
successfully by National Health Service (NHS) acute, 
ambulance and mental health trusts. However, healthcare 
relies on a range of complex interactions of people, 
skills, technologies and drugs, and sometimes things do 
go wrong. For most countries, patient safety is now the 
key issue in healthcare quality and risk management. 
The Department of Health (the Department) estimates 
that one in ten patients admitted to NHS hospitals will be 
unintentionally harmed, a rate similar to other developed 
countries. Around 50 per cent of these patient safety 
incidentsa could have been avoided, if only lessons from 
previous incidents had been learned. Figure 1 details 
some of the key facts. 
“Patient safety incident: any unintended or 
unexpected event that lead to death, disability, 
injury, disease or suffering for one or more patients”
“Near miss: any situation that could have resulted in 
an accident, injury or illness for a patient, but did not, 
due to chance or timely intervention by another”
a Terminology developed by the National Patient Safety Agency to be used instead of the terms ‘adverse event’ or ‘clinical error’.
      
1 Key facts and best estimates about the extent and impact of patient safety incidents
n An analysis of 256 (96 per cent) NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts’ responses to our main survey showed that 
in 2003-04 trusts recorded some 885,832 incidents and near 
misses. Our follow up survey found that for 2004-05 there were 
around 974,000 reported incidents and near misses. Few trusts 
included hospital acquired infections which may increase this 
by around 300,000 incidents (around 30 per cent of which 
may have been preventable).
n	 The most common incidents reported were: patient injury (due to 
falls), followed by medication errors, equipment related incidents, 
record documentation error and communication failure.
n Whilst reports of near misses have also increased, far fewer 
are reported than research suggests should be the case. 
n Patient safety incidents cost the NHS an estimated  
£2 billion a year in extra bed days, in addition hospital 
acquired infections add a further £1 billion to these costs1. 
n The cost of settled clinical negligence claims in 2003-04 was 
£423 million and provisions for outstanding clinical negligence 
claims as at end of 2003-04 were in excess of £2 billion.
n A retrospective study of patient records in two English 
hospitals found 10.8 per cent of patients experienced an 
adverse incident; of which around half (5.2 per cent) were 
judged to have been preventable. These adverse incidents 
caused permanent impairment in six per cent and contributed 
to death in eight per cent of cases2.
n	 Our analysis of trust surveys found that 169 trusts were able 
to provide data on the number of deaths as a result of patient 
safety incidents. This showed that in 2004-05 there were some 
2,181 deaths recorded but it is acknowledged that there is 
significant under reporting of deaths and serious incidents. 
Other published estimates of death as a result of patient safety 
incidents range from 840 to 34,000 but in reality the NHS 
simply does not know.
n An international review of nine retrospective studies of patient 
records found that the average incidence of adverse events was 
8.9 per cent (range from 3.8 -16.6 per cent).
Source: National Audit Office
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2 There are numerous stakeholders with a role in 
keeping patients safe in the NHS, many of whom require 
trusts to report details of patient safety incidents and near 
misses to them (Figure 2). However, a number of previous 
National Audit Office reports have highlighted concerns 
that the NHS has limited information on the extent and 
impact of clinical and non-clinical incidents and trusts need 
to learn from these incidents and share good practice across 
the NHS more effectively (Appendix 1). 
3 In 2000, the Chief Medical Officer’s report An 
organisation with a memory1, identified that the key 
barriers to reducing the number of patient safety incidents 
were an organisational culture that inhibited reporting and 
the lack of a cohesive national system for identifying and 
sharing lessons learnt. 
4 In response, the Department published Building a 
safer NHS for patients3 detailing plans and a timetable 
for promoting patient safety. The goal was to encourage 
improvements in reporting and learning through the 
development of a new mandatory national reporting 
scheme for patient safety incidents and near misses. Central 
to the plan was establishing the National Patient Safety 
Agency to improve patient safety by reducing the risk of 
harm through error. The National Patient Safety Agency was 
expected to: collect and analyse information; assimilate 
other safety-related information from a variety of existing 
reporting systems; learn lessons and produce solutions.
5 We therefore examined whether the NHS has 
been successful in improving the patient safety culture, 
encouraging reporting and learning from patient safety 
incidents. Key parts of our approach were a census of 
267 NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts in 
Autumn 2004, followed by a re-survey in August 2005 
and an omnibus survey of patients (Appendix 2). We also 
reviewed practices in other industries (Appendix 3) and 
international healthcare systems (Appendix 4), and the 
National Patient Safety Agency’s progress in developing its 
National Reporting and Learning System (Appendix 5) and 
other related activities (Appendix 6).
Overall conclusion
6 An organisation with a memory1 was an important 
milestone in the NHS’s patient safety agenda and marked 
the drive to improve reporting and learning. At the 
local level the vast majority of trusts have developed a 
predominantly open and fair reporting culture but with 
pockets of blame and scope to improve their strategies for 
sharing good practice. Indeed in our re-survey we found 
that local performance had continued to improve with more 
trusts reporting having an open and fair reporting culture, 
more trusts with open reporting systems and improvements 
in perceptions of the levels of under-reporting. At the 
national level, progress on developing the national reporting 
system for learning has been slower than set out in the 
Department’s strategy of 20013 and there is a need to 
improve evaluation and sharing of lessons and solutions by 
all organisations with a stake in patient safety. There is also 
no clear system for monitoring that lessons are learned at the 
local level. Specifically:
a The safety culture within trusts is improving, driven 
largely by the Department’s clinical governance 
initiative4 and the development of more effective risk 
management systems in response to incentives under 
initiatives such as the NHS Litigation Authority’s 
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (Appendix 7). 
However, trusts are still predominantly reactive in 
their response to patient safety issues and parts of 
some organisations still operate a blame culture.
b All trusts have established effective reporting systems 
at the local level, although under-reporting remains 
a problem within some groups of staff, types of 
incidents and near misses. The National Patient Safety 
Agency did not develop and roll out the National 
Reporting and Learning System by December 2002 
as originally envisaged. All trusts were linked to the 
system by 31 December 2004. By August 2005, at 
least 35 trusts still had not submitted any data to the 
National Reporting and Learning System.
c Most trusts pointed to specific improvements 
derived from lessons learnt from their local incident 
reporting systems, but these are still not widely 
promulgated, either within or between trusts. 
The National Patient Safety Agency has provided 
only limited feedback to trusts of evidence-based 
solutions or actions derived from the national 
reporting system. It published its first feedback report 
from the Patient Safety Observatory in July 20055.
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  2 The stakeholders in patient safety
Source: National Audit Office
NOTES
1 Organisations to which a patient safety incident will be reported, either on a voluntary or statutory basis (see also Figure 14).
2 Following the Department of Health’s review of Arm’s Length Bodies, the functions of these organisations have been or are in the process of being,   
 transferred to other bodies. 
While the patient is at the centre of the safety agenda, there are many people and a large number of organisations with a role in the 
management of risk of unintended harm. Several of these organisations may require a report of the same incident at the same time.
Royal Colleges
Patient Advice and  
Liaison Service










Independent Complaints Advisory Service
NHS Litigation Authority1
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency1




National Patient Safety Agency1
Serious Hazards of Transfusion Safety1
NHS Clinical Governance Support Team2
Department of Health1
National Clinical Assessment Authority2
Mental Health Act Commission1,2
Healthcare Commission
Health and Safety Executive1
Professional regulatory bodies
Patients Association
Professional associations and trade unions
Patient
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The culture within NHS trusts is now 
more open and fair 
7 A just and fair culture is a key requirement if 
reporting and learning are to be improved. All trusts 
have continued to build on and develop their clinical 
governance arrangements, but with varying degrees of 
success. Most trusts have succeeded in reducing the 
blame culture. By helping trusts to deal more effectively 
with poorly performing doctors, the National Clinical 
Assessment Authorityb is continuing to contribute to the 
development of a more open and fair culture and, as 
a result, suspensions have increasingly been avoided. 
However, the support provided applies only to doctors. 
In 2004, the National Patient Safety Agency produced 
guidance aimed at supporting trusts in assessing their safety 
culture and promulgated a tool to prompt trusts to focus on 
why the patient safety incident happened, and not who was 
to blame, and to adopt a systematic approach to decisions 
about the employee involved (Appendix 6). 
8 Within local organisations strong leadership and 
governance at chief executive and board level is crucial. 
Virtually all chief executives provided examples of their 
personal involvement with the patient safety agenda. 
Since 2001, over 130 trust boards or key members of 
trust boards have engaged with the Board Development 
Team at the NHS Clinical Governance Support Team. 
More recently non-executive trust board members from 
113 trusts have undertaken Leadership in Patient Safety 
Training provided by the NHS Appointments Commission 
and the National Patient Safety Agency. 
9 An organisational top down approach on its own 
is not sufficient. The regulatory bodies, Royal Colleges 
and the other professional bodies have all placed greater 
emphasis on individual responsibility and accountability 
for patient safety. Although few trusts provided incentives 
for staff to improve patient safety, 93 per cent involved 
them in identifying priorities and designing solutions.
10 As nine out of ten NHS employees work in teams6, 
effective communication between staff is important 
to reduce the risk of unintended harm to patients, yet 
trusts often cite failure in communication as a reason for 
an incident. Communicating openly with patients and 
carers is also essential but only 24 per cent of trusts were 
routinely informing patients when an incident that they 
had been involved in was reported to the trust.
11 To provide evidence that NHS organisations were 
doing their reasonable best to manage themselves so as 
to protect patients, staff and the public against risks of all 
kinds, the Department established the mandatory Controls 
Assurance Standards in 1999. Trusts had to undertake 
a self-assessment against defined criteria. For the Risk 
Management System standard these criteria included 
board accountability, adverse incident reporting and 
complaints and claims handling. Over the five years of its 
operation average compliance increased from 52 per cent 
to 87 per cent. 
12 In August 2004, the Department announced that key 
elements of the Controls Assurance Standards would be 
incorporated in a new performance assessment framework 
based around a set of core and developmental standards 
(Standards for Better Health), with compliance evaluated 
by the Healthcare Commission. Safety is the first of seven 
domains in these standards (Appendix 7). 
13 Assessment of trusts’ risk management systems 
undertaken on behalf of the NHS Litigation Authority 
has also provided a strong incentive for trusts to improve 
their reporting and learning systems (Appendix 7). Each 
year since the operation of the Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts many trusts have gradually 
improved their risk management systems and seen 
their contributions reduced according to the level of 
compliance achieved (Figure 4 page 19).
Local reporting has improved  
but there have been delays  
in establishing an effective  
national system 
14 Unless trusts are confident that their reporting 
systems identify the main risks to patient safety they cannot 
target interventions effectively. All trusts had implemented 
integrated reporting systems as part of risk management. By 
2005, the majority of these reporting systems were either 
confidential (34 per cent) or open (63 per cent) with  
38 per cent of these trusts also providing an anonymous 
reporting route for use by staff who may be fearful of 
raising their concerns. Reported incidents were analysed at 
the local level with relevant information passed onto one 
or more of around 30 organisations. 
b The National Clinical Assessment Authority was established as a special health authority in 2001 to provide support and expert advice and an assessment 
service to NHS organisations that are faced with concerns over the performance of individual doctors and dentists (Appendix 2 details our previous work on 
this issue). Following the Department’s Arm's Length Bodies Review, from April 2005, the National Clinical Assessment Authority became part of the National 
Patient Safety Agency and was renamed the National Clinical Assessment Service.
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15 Seventy-eight per cent of trusts told us that their 
emphasis on encouraging reporting was having a positive 
impact on the number of incidents reported and the 
total number of patient safety incidents reported within 
trusts has risen year on year. Despite the general increase 
in reporting, trusts acknowledged that a substantial 
number of incidents still go unreported (trusts on average 
estimated that 22 per cent of incidents go unreported, 
mainly medication errors and incidents leading to serious 
harm). Reporting of near misses was also low, mainly due 
to different perceptions of what constitutes a near miss. 
Training can help improve levels of reporting but there 
has been no evaluation of the efficacy of courses and no 
system for accrediting those currently in use.
16 Healthcare organisations in other countries, having 
compared the merits of anonymous and confidential 
reporting, have generally opted for confidential reporting. 
The Department proposed a confidential scheme, 
mandatory for trusts, to record patient safety incidents and 
near misses across the NHS3, however the National Patient 
Safety Agency recommended the development of two 
reporting systems, one which would interface with trusts’ 
incident reporting systems, but with the identity of the 
patient and person reporting stripped out, and the second, 
a totally anonymous voluntary e-Form which can be shared 
with the trust if the person making the report agrees. 
17 The roll out of the National Patient Safety Agency’s 
National Reporting and Learning System has taken two years 
longer than originally envisaged. By 31 December 2004 all 
trusts had the technology to link to the system but many still 
had to map details from their local system to the national 
system. By the end of March 2005, some 170 acute, 
ambulance and mental health trusts had reported 79,220 
incidents (a further 6,122 incidents were reported by 
primary care trusts making a total of 85,342 patient safety 
incidents reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System up to March 2005).
18 The e-Form was launched in September 2004 and by 
April 2005, 108 reports had been made using this route. 
Whilst the National Patient Safety Agency does not know 
how many staff will make use of the e-Form, it believes 
this is a rich source of information for learning5 and 
provides a safety net for those who are too frightened to 
report to their local system. Five trusts told us that they do 
not want an anonymous system as this undermines local 
reporting and learning and that they would discourage use 
of the e-Form. Twenty-nine trusts are actively encouraging 
the use of the e-Form.
19 Building a safer NHS for Patients3 required the NHS 
to establish agreed definitions of incidents for the purposes 
of reporting, gradually moving to an international 
standardised taxonomy (description and classification of 
incidents). The National Patient Safety Agency developed 
its taxonomy in consultation with trusts but it is unlike 
many trusts’ taxonomies and, in order to link to the 
national system, trusts had to map it to their own. At the 
time of our survey 82 per cent of trusts had had difficulties 
with the mapping exercise, and 17 per cent of these said 
that they had experienced major difficulties. Two-thirds of 
trusts told us that the national taxonomy was not specific 
enough so were continuing to use their own. It is also 
different from taxonomies used in other countries. The 
World Health Organisation is currently developing an 
international taxonomy which would require the  
National Patient Safety Agency and trusts to make  
changes to their taxonomies if they are to comply.
20 The National Patient Safety Agency worked with 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency in order to test the feasibility of a single data 
entry point for reports of errors involving medical devices. 
However, this did not prove possible due to the statutory 
responsibilities of the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency and the requirements of the National 
Patient Safety Agency. Indeed there has been no further 
development in this area and trusts are still required to 
report the same incident to more than one organisation.
21 Given that the Department’s aim was to encourage 
reporting, no targets were set for reducing the number of 
reported patient safety incidents. Rather, the Department 
set targets for reducing the incidence of four specific types 
of errors (maladministration of spinal injections; serious 
error in the use of medicines; suicides by mental health 
inpatients as a result of hanging from non-collapsible rails 
and harm in obstetrics and gynaecology). Whilst there 
have been no reports of incidents involving the first type of 
error, there are limited data to judge whether the target on 
medication errors has been realised and mixed messages on 
progress against the targets on suicide as a result of hanging 
and obstetrics and gynaecology. For example, although 
negligence claims for obstetrics and gynaecology appear 
to be reducing, the Healthcare Commission highlighted 
concerns about the safety of some maternity services7, 8.
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A number of local and national 
systems are in place for analysing 
and sharing lessons learnt, but most 
are under-used
22 Most trusts did analyse incident reports and other 
information. Indeed most had been carrying out in-depth 
investigations of incidents at the local level for a number 
of years. Seventy-six per cent of trusts told us that they 
were now encouraging staff to use the National Patient 
Safety Agency’s root cause analysis tool, with many 
noting that it had helped to improve the quality and 
consistency of in-depth investigations. A number of trusts 
remarked that monitoring and investigating incidents 
created additional demands on busy senior staff, and 
consequently they did not always conduct a full root 
cause analysis of all serious incidents. The quality of 
reports on investigations was also very variable and 
recommendations were rarely actioned by organisations 
outside the trust in which the event had occurred.
23 Dissemination of learning and the development of 
solutions was patchy and there was also no systematic 
monitoring to ensure implementation within the trust. 
Clinical audit can be an effective way to evaluate whether 
improvements are being implemented but a number of 
National Audit Office reports have highlighted concerns 
about the limited extent and coverage of clinical audit 
(Appendix 1). The Commission for Health Improvement 
reported in 2004 that this was still under-developed in 
many trusts9.
24 Over half of trusts reported that patients were 
involved in both identifying safety priorities and 
developing ways to prevent recurrence. However, only  
six per cent of patients we surveyed said they were 
consulted about how the safety incident they experienced 
could be prevented from happening to someone else. 
25 Ninety-nine per cent of trusts identified specific 
interventions that they had developed to address patient 
safety issues (some are described in this report). However, 
few trusts have carried out any cost benefit analysis of 
interventions/solutions to improve patient safety. Given the 
estimated £2 billion cost of extra bed days due to incidents 
and the potential litigation costs, we consider that in many 
circumstances the cost of intervention is likely to be far less 
than the cost of failing to prevent the incident. 
26 At a regional level, half the strategic health 
authorities used clinical governance networks to 
disseminate learning and in some areas they have 
introduced patient safety learning sets. However, a 
number told us they were ill-equipped to share lessons 
and many felt that they did not have the capacity or 
capability to monitor the implementation of good 
practice. There is also a risk that as foundation trusts are 
not required to report to strategic health authorities they 
will miss out on the sharing of learning. Other sources 
of learning are organised networks, like those for cancer 
and coronary heart disease, and ambulance trusts use 
the Ambulance Service Association. Since summer 2004, 
the National Patient Safety Agency’s 28 Patient Safety 
Managers have been working with most trusts to help 
share good practice. 
27 One way of disseminating information about 
necessary changes is the Department’s Safety Alert 
Broadcast System. The Department, the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, NHS Estatesc 
and the National Patient Safety Agency issue safety alerts 
to trusts for them to act upon within a defined timescale. 
During 2004-05, trusts received 93 alerts through the 
System. Trusts told us that there was a lack of clarity 
in the rationale for the decision to release information 
as an alert and some felt that a number of these alerts 
did not tell them anything new. All wanted better links 
and communication between the bodies that issue 
notices via the Safety Alert Broadcast System. The Chief 
Medical Officer’s annual report10 identified concerns that 
compliance with alerts was slow and some trusts which 
reported compliance were subsequently found to be 
non-compliant.
28 The Department expected that the new national 
reporting system for learning would bring about changes at 
trust and national levels, through the analysis of incidents 
and then subsequently their root causes. As at April 2005, 
the National Patient Safety Agency had issued limited 
feedback to trusts of lessons emerging from their reports to 
the national system. Although the National Reporting and 
Learning System has the capacity to collect contributory 
factors, these are not mandatory and the intention is to 
identify trends that can then be analysed in greater detail. 
Trusts told us they were concerned that information flow 
was one-way to the National Patient Safety Agency and 
the general perception was that the National Reporting 
and Learning System was simply an information collection 
system. The July 2005 report from the Patient Safety 
Observatory should start to address this perception.5
c NHS Estates, responsibilities for health and safety environment alerts are being transferred to the Department as part of the Arm’s Length Bodies Review.
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29 The Department envisaged that the National 
Patient Safety Agency would assimilate other safety 
related information from a variety of existing reporting 
systems and other sources such as NHS complaints, 
litigation, National Confidential Enquiries and national 
audits (Figure 3). We found that there has been limited 
progress on assimilating and disseminating lessons from 
these different sources of information. Furthermore, the 
individual organisations responsible for litigation and 
complaints have until recently not made as much use of 
the valuable data they collect as they might to help trusts 
avoid similar incidents. 
30 The National Programme for Information Technology 
in the NHS, being delivered by the Department’s 
agency NHS Connecting for Health, has a crucial role 
in developing the technology to ensure that relevant 
information can be stored securely and accessed readily.  
A key component, the National Care Record, has 
significant potential to improve safety as lost or poorly 
completed records are a major contributory factor to 
patient safety incidents. Technology will also facilitate 
retrospective audits, improve access to guidance and 
reduce the risks of incorrect drug prescribing and dosages. 
In time, trusts’ individual reporting systems will be 
integrated into the National Programme. The National 
Patient Safety Agency is working with NHS Connecting for 
Health’s patient safety sub-group to take this forward.
  
3 Progress towards the planned national reporting system for learning and expected feedback routes
Staff
NHS Trusts
National Patient  
Safety Agency’s 
National Reporting and 
Learning System
Standardised Information; 
Agreed definitions; Minimum 







Australia, the United 
States of America
Information from all other major existing adverse event reporting systems feed in 
n Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency - medical devices and adverse drug reactions
n	 NHS Litigation Authority - clinical negligence
n	 Health Protection Agency - infection surveillance
n	 NHS Estates (now part of the Department) - health and safety environment
n	 National Institute for Clinical Excellence - Confidential Enquiries (now part of the National Patient Safety Agency’s responsibilities)
n	 Healthcare Commission - complaints
n	 Ombudsman - complaints
n	 Health and Safety Executive - reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences regulations (1995)
Feedback
Taking place Yet to routinely take place Route in place but not used
Patients/carers
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For the Department:
a The Department established a number of arm’s 
length bodies with a role in keeping patients safe. 
The Department needs to use its arm’s length 
bodies’ performance monitoring system to 
establish appropriate actions and milestones to: 
n enhance and sustain the development of an 
effective safety culture within NHS trusts; 
n improve the reliability and completeness of 
trust incident reporting and for disseminating 
the results of national reporting back to trusts; 
n provide effective feedback of lessons and 
solutions to improve safety.
b The National Clinical Assessment Authority has 
played a key role in improving the management 
of suspensions of doctors but other clinical staff 
are not covered by the Authority’s remit. In the 
Government’s response to the previous Committee 
of Public Accounts recommendationd to consider 
extending the Authority’s remit the Department 
told the Committee that the functions of the 
National Clinical Assessment Authority were being 
transferred to the National Patient Safety Agency 
from 1 April 2005, and that this consideration was 
therefore on hold. Given that the transfer is now 
complete, the Department should now respond 
fully to the Committee’s recommendation to 
consider extending the role of the National Clinical 
Assessment Service to other clinical staff.
c It is imperative that patient safety becomes a core 
part of professional training, including helping 
clinical staff understand their responsibility for patient 
safety and the benefits of working in an open and 
questioning environment. The Department needs to 
build on its work with the professional regulatory 
bodies and Royal Colleges to better embed patient 
safety training in all pre-registration professional 
training curricula and to raise the profile of patient 
safety issues in post-registration training. 
d Despite the rationalisation envisaged in Building a 
safer NHS for patients3, trusts are still required to 
report the same incident to numerous national bodies 
and revise their data sets to capture new information 
which those bodies require. Wherever possible, 
incidents should only be reported once and, as 
trusts move to electronic reporting, the Department 
should explore the possibility of recommending 
a single entry point, for example via the National 
Programme for Information Technology in the 
NHS. As a minimum the Department should 
consult with NHS Connecting for Health, the NHS 
Health and Social Care Information Centre, the 
National Patient Safety Agency, the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and the 
relevant signatories of the Healthcare Inspection 
Concordate to identify the scope to rationalise the 
number of data entry points. 
d The management of suspensions of clinical staff in NHS hospitals and ambulance trusts in England ; Forty-seventh Report of Session 2003-04 (HC 296).
e A Concordat between the Healthcare Commission and nine other bodies inspecting, regulating and auditing healthcare was launched in June 2004. The 
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For the National Patient  
Safety Agency:
e Many trusts and organisations involved in collecting 
data on patient safety incidents consider that the 
taxonomy developed by the National Patient Safety 
Agency is not specific enough for their purposes. 
The National Patient Safety Agency should work 
to adopt a taxonomy that ideally corresponds 
to the international taxonomy being developed 
by the World Health Organisation, but as a 
minimum should gain buy-in from all trusts and 
other bodies requiring reports on incidents to a 
mandatory minimum data set to ensure that there 
is consistency in the data collected at local and 
national levels. 
f Many trusts are questioning the value of sending 
data to the National Reporting and Learning System 
given the lack of feedback and would like to see 
more of an emphasis on solutions. The National 
Patient Safety Agency needs to agree with the 
Department a regular publication timetable, so 
that opportunities to sensationalise the data are 
reduced, and provide examples of how the NHS is 
learning from the data. One option is to produce 
quarterly updates so that it becomes standard. The 
National Patient Safety Agency needs to expedite 
its evaluation and feedback programme and focus 
on developing solutions to nationwide problems to 
mitigate the risk that trusts will stop sending data to 
the National Reporting and Learning System. These 
solutions should be accompanied by a sample 
business case which trusts can then customise.
g There is little dissemination of learning between 
most trusts. The National Patient Safety Agency’s 
Patient Safety Managers should establish formal 
systems to capture learning in specialties and 
share learning across other teams and trusts at 
both local and national level. In addition they 
should investigate the possibility of establishing 
local networks similar to those for cancer, which 
will have the potential to improve the delivery of 
patient-centred care by disseminating learning 
about the whole patient journey. 
h There is currently no scheme for accreditation 
or benchmarking of patient safety training; thus 
trusts have no assurance that the training they 
commission is a good product. The National Patient 
Safety Agency should look to other industries 
and together with the NHS Institute for Learning, 
Skills and Innovation, develop an accreditation 
scheme for all patient safety training supplied 
by external providers. It should also evaluate 
training programmes operated by trusts to build 
up a library of good practice to enable trusts to 
customise their training to best effect.
i NHS Connecting for Health has asked the 
National Patient Safety Agency to help assure 
the specification for the National Programme for 
Information Technology in the NHS to ensure that 
patient safety is inherent throughout the system. 
In taking this forward the National Patient Safety 
Agency should ensure that Connecting for Health 
fully understands and builds on the lessons from 
the development and roll out of the National 
Reporting and Learning System.
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY10
For the Healthcare Commission
j Safety alerts are an important mechanism for 
implementing solutions and we support the 
conclusions in the Chief Medical Officer’s recent 
report10. Information on compliance should be 
made public and the Healthcare Commission 
should place special focus on verification of NHS 
trusts’ compliance when assessing performance 
against the Standards for Better Health.
k No single NHS organisation is responsible for 
auditing implementation of best practice solutions for 
patient safety issues. The Healthcare Commission 
should ensure that in assessing the safety domain it 
builds in assessment criteria that evaluate how well 
solutions have been implemented.
l Information from complaints and litigation is still 
greatly under-exploited as a learning resource. The 
Healthcare Commission needs to expedite its 
in-depth analysis of information from the NHS 
Complaints system and share lessons on a regular 
basis. The Healthcare Commission needs to work 
with the NHS Litigation Authority and the National 
Patient Safety Agency to agree how best to share 
the data and where the responsibility lies for 
identifying key lessons and providing trusts with 
feedback from these analyses.
For NHS acute, mental health and 
ambulance trusts
m Despite improvements in safety culture many NHS 
employees still fear blame or unequal treatment if 
they report incidents and this remains a major barrier 
to increasing accurate and honest reporting. There 
is a need for trusts to re-enforce their commitment 
to an open and fair reporting culture and to support 
staffing initiatives to improve. Trusts should assess 
their safety culture using one of the established 
tools, such as those listed in the Seven steps to 
patient safety11, and implement an action plan to 
address the identified issues.
n Financial problems and staff shortages can push 
patient safety down the list of trusts’ priorities. 
Although the potential avoidable costs of patient 
safety incidents is estimated to be as much as  
£1 billion1, some areas of investment are likely to 
have a bigger pay back than others. Trusts should 
ensure that funding for managing and improving 
patient safety reflects the organisation’s risk 
register, and require their patient safety leads to 
develop annual business cases that demonstrate 
the opportunity costs of the improvements they 
plan to make, where relevant these should build 
on the solutions and accompanying business cases 
developed by the National Patient Safety Agency. 
o Patients have little involvement in the identification 
of patient safety priorities and in the design of 
solutions in most trusts. Trusts need to engage 
patients more in identifying important patient 
safety issues and designing solutions and make 
better use of information gained through contacts 
with Patient Advice and Liaison Services. Trusts 
should ensure that they fully investigate complaints 
and litigation claims and analyse trends in both so 
as to learn from them. 
p Under-reporting is a problem in some staff groups 
more than others and there is a perception amongst 
staff that not all employees take responsibility for 
patient safety reporting. Trusts should target specific 
training and feedback on those groups of staff that 
are less likely to report. They should liaise with 
the National Patient Safety Agency to identify and 
learn lessons from trusts which have achieved high 
reporting rates and also to build on the lessons 
from national initiatives to encourage reporting 
such as the work being done by the Agency on 
encouraging junior doctors to report. 
q Near misses are generally under-reported and 
information on outcomes, particularly death and 
serious harm is poor. Trusts should ensure that 
their reporting policies clearly define a ‘near miss’ 
and should develop strategies to encourage more 
staff to report them to make sure potential serious 
incidents that were prevented are not overlooked. 
Trust should also triangulate information from 
various data sources such as complaints, claims, 
coroners reports etc to ensure that all deaths and 
serious harm as a result of a patient safety incident 
are recorded on their incident reporting system. 
summary
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The safety culture within NHS trusts is now 
more open and fair
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1.1 Although the great majority of patient care in the 
NHS is of a high standard, the number and complexity of 
patient interventions means that patients can sometimes 
suffer unintended harm. In 1997, the Government 
introduced a ten year programme to continuously improve 
the overall standard of clinical care; central to this was  
the clinical governance initiative. By 2000, the NHS was 
still failing to learn from things that went wrong  
and had limited systems in place to put things right.  
An organisation with a memory1 therefore identified the 
conditions needed to improve people’s confidence in the 
NHS. It advocated a change in the safety culture, from one 
that was essentially based on fear and blame, to an open 
and fair reporting culture to transform the NHS into an 
effective learning organisation. 
1.2 In June 2000, the Department accepted all the 
recommendations of An organisation with a memory1 
and made a commitment to implement them in The NHS 
Plan12. The 2001 policy document, Building a safer NHS 
for patients3, set out how the Department planned to take 
forward the patient safety agenda and the timetable for 
implementing the identified changes. It advocated that 
patient safety and risk reduction should be at the heart of 
the framework for improving quality of care, including 
protection against poorly performing clinicians. A key 
action was the establishment of the National Patient Safety 
Agency in July 2001. This Part of the report examines  
the progress in developing an NHS safety culture. In 
particular whether:
n trusts had created an environment in which staff 
could report concerns without fear; 
n communication with staff and patients was two-way 
and effective team-working predominated; 
n there was a high profile lead on the issue; and 
n there was integrated risk management.
Progress has been made both locally 
and nationally in encouraging an 
open and fair culture
1.3 To establish a safety culture an organisation must 
build a climate where staff feel they can report concerns 
without fear and they understand that they are accountable 
for unacceptable behaviours. Eighty per cent of the senior 
clinical and non-clinical managers in a YouGov poll13 said 
creating a culture that encourages reporting and avoids 
blame was one of the most beneficial ways of improving 
patient safety. We found that 97 per cent of trusts had 
made a clear statement of support for an open and fair 
culture, and around three-quarters of them disseminated  
it to staff by management cascade and/or through  
written communication. 
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1.4 Almost all trusts reported that they had made 
progress in reducing the culture of blame. Our analysis 
of the specific actions that trusts had taken to improve 
their patient safety culture showed that the most common 
were: the introduction or increased provision of training 
on patient safety (35 per cent); and the employment 
or re-deployment of staff to improve risk management 
(22 per cent). By July 2005, 31 per cent of trusts felt 
that they had an open and fair culture throughout the 
organisation (compared with 23 per cent in 2004) and 
65 per cent that they had a predominantly open and fair 
culture (72 per cent in 2004). 
1.5 We also asked trusts to rate their position in 2005 
compared with 2004 on a scale of 1-7 (where 1 is 
predominantly a blame culture, 4 is moving towards an 
open and fair culture but pockets of blame exist in some 
major areas of the trust and 7 is predominantly an open 
and fair culture throughout the trust). The average score  
in 2005 was 5.66 compared with 4.73 in 2004. Overall, 
68 per cent of trusts reported that they had improved,  
28 per cent that they had stayed the same but two per cent 
felt that they got worse. Executive directors of patient safety 
may be under-estimating the prevalence of the blame 
culture as only half (51 per cent) of trusts had actually 
evaluated their safety culture (mostly commonly through 
their staff survey and external audits or assessments).
1.6 In 2001, because of trusts over-reliance on 
disciplinary measures, the Department set up the National 
Clinical Assessment Authority to provide quick objective 
assessments on doctors’ performance and to place a 
greater emphasis on using education and training to 
address problems. Our report on the management of 
suspensions of clinical staff14 highlighted trusts’ difficulties 
in managing poor performance and that referring a 
case to the National Clinical Assessment Authority, at 
an early stage, helped to reduce the perception that the 
trust operated a blame culture. Other clinical staff such 
as nurses were not given the same level of support and 
we recommended that the work of the National Clinical 
Assessment Authority should be extended to cover all 
clinical staff. Since 2003, the National Clinical Assessment 
Authorityf has continued to contribute to the development 
of a more open and fair culture and through its work 
suspensions have been avoided in a growing number  
of cases. 
1.7 Surveys of nurses and other non-medical staff 
highlighted that they perceived that the blame culture 
continues to exist in the NHS. Whilst 25 per cent of 
respondents to a Unison survey15 (2003) said that the 
culture within their trust had improved since 2000, a  
third of respondents still believed that their trust would  
not want to know about a serious problem affecting 
services. The Royal College of Nursing16 found a 
perception remained that there was significant disparity 
between the treatment of doctors and nurses, by both 
their employer and the regulatory body, following a 
serious patient safety incident. The National NHS Staff 
Survey 20046 showed that only 47 per cent of ambulance 
personnel felt their employers treated those involved in 
an error, near miss or incident fairly and 26 per cent said 
their employers blamed or punished staff when they made 
errors. Case example 1 shows how one ambulance service 
has taken steps to address these perceptions and begun to 
embed an open and fair culture in the Trust.
1.8 One of the key targets for the National Patient Safety 
Agency was to support an NHS culture that is open and 
fair. Its Seven steps to patient safety11 (February 2004) 
provides a checklist and references a number of available 
tools to help trusts assess their safety culture (Appendix 6). 
Forty-five per cent of trusts had actively disseminated this 
guidance to staff in some form. Seven steps to patient 
safety11 also drew attention to the Incident Decision Tree, 
an interactive web-based tool aimed at helping trusts focus 
on possible system failures and trust-wide weaknesses 
rather than who was to blame. Trusts told us the tool had 
helped ensure there was fairer and consistent management 
of staff involved in reported patient safety incidents or 
near misses. 
Trusts are now more likely to be fostering 
open and questioning communication 
between staff in teams
1.9 High performing teams with collective responsibility 
for their actions are important if trusts are to deliver safe 
and effective care. Nine out of ten NHS staff work as 
part of a team6 but most trusts identified that a lack of 
communication within teams was one of the root causes of 
patient safety incidents. Some had therefore concentrated 
on making communication in multi-disciplinary teams 
more open and questioning to reduce the risk of 
f Under the Arm’s Length Bodies Review, the National Clinical Assessment Authority became part of the National Patient Safety Agency from April 2005 and 
was renamed the National Clinical Assessment Service.
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unintentional harm (Case example 2 overleaf). Indeed, 
teams from 83 trusts have attended the Team Resource 
Management and Patient Safety Programme run by the 
NHS Clinical Governance Support Team. The programme 
develops capacity for team working by drawing on 
experiences from other industries, particularly aviation, 
and examining the impact of personality and behaviour on 
co-operative working.
There is still more to do to achieve a 
fully open and fair culture with regard to 
communicating with patients
1.10 Good practice guidance17 encourages trusts to 
inform patients when they are involved in an incident 
and clinical staff need to be trained to develop an open 
approach to communicating with patients. In our survey, 
69 per cent of trusts had criteria for staff to follow but only 
24 per cent routinely informed patients when they were 
involved in a reported incident; 6 per cent did not inform 
patients at all. A YouGov poll13 found most senior clinical 
managers believed patients and their families should 
be told if patients suffered harm, and most non-clinical 
managers believed that patients should be told when there 
has been a problem, even if they suffered no harm.
1.11 Patients’ perceptions of the practice of informing 
them differed from those of the trusts. Fifty-one per cent  
of patients in our survey said that when their treatment 
had gone wrong, the hospital had informed them and  
56 per cent were completely satisfied with the 
explanations given following the incident. Those patients 
who were provided with an explanation of risks and  
how to minimise them were less likely to complain or 
make a claim, with only 13 per cent going on to take 
further action.
1.12 Patients are also being encouraged to take greater 
responsibility for their safety. Seventy-three per cent of 
trusts reported that they provided information to patients 
to help them to maintain their own safety. (Most common 
were written materials to take away (48 per cent) or 
posters in public areas (38 per cent) and 42 per cent 
of trusts stated that they provided oral information as 
a matter of course). In contrast, 56 per cent of patients 
in our survey said that they had been informed about 
maintaining their own safety and how to minimise their 
risk of harm.
CASE EXAMPLE 1
North East Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Situation: Prior to the merger of the Northumbria and Durham 
Ambulance Services in 1999, the Trusts’ approach to the 
management of staff involved in patient safety incidents had 
been confrontational, often involving suspension from duty. 
Action: Following the merger, the North East Ambulance Service 
NHS Trust has moved towards a non-disciplinary approach to 
investigating such incidents. In response to our 2002 census for 
the Management of suspensions of clinical staff in NHS hospital 
and ambulance trusts in England14, the Trust indicated that it 
was moving towards a fair-blame culture and had introduced 
a panel system to minimise the need to take final action. Two 
years on, the system is well embedded in the Trust.
Outcome: In the event of an incident requiring an investigation, 
staff are called to a ‘variation to clinical practice’ panel meeting. 
The panel includes the ambulance crew involved in the incident 
under investigation, a union representative and representatives 
from Trust management. The trade union was closely involved 
in the development of the panel, and the opportunity to have 
a union representative at panel meetings was an important 
factor in staff acceptance of the process. If the panel finds that a 
staff member has committed an error, the Trust ensures that the 
individual takes responsibility and the Trust would take further 
action, such as providing re-training, if required. 
This panel process, combined with continuing professional 
development training, works to ensure staff are aware of their 
professional responsibilities. The development of this more 
collaborative approach has had promising results and has 
been a key step in embedding an open and fair culture within 
the Trust. Staff are now much more confident that they can 
report incidents that occur without fear of disproportionate 
repercussion or punishment. 
Source: National Audit Office
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Most trusts have established a clear 
and strong focus on patient safety
Many trusts are building a safer culture 
through the development of leadership
1.13 All but three trusts gave us examples of how  
the chief executive had personally been involved in 
promoting and driving forward the patient safety agenda 
(Illustrative examples 1). All trusts had a board director 
responsible for leading on patient safety – commonly the 
director of nursing (47 per cent), the medical director 
(32 per cent) or the chief executive (eleven per cent). A 
YouGov poll13 of senior managers in the NHS found that 
most agreed that patient safety was a high priority for their 
organisation, though not top priority.
1.14 The Commission for Health Improvement’s clinical 
governance reviews conducted between December 2000 
and March 2004 revealed a lack of good quality clinical 
leadership in acute, ambulance and mental health trusts.9 
During the last four years the Department has provided 
assistance and advice on developing effective leadership 
through the NHS Clinical Governance Support Team. In 
particular, it provided a number of board development 
programmes and supported challenged organisations 
to make sustainable improvements. By April 2005, 
trust boards or key members of trust boards from over 
130 acute, ambulance and mental health trusts had 
engaged with the Board Development Team. Between 
November 2004 and March 2005 the NHS Appointments 
Commission and the National Patient Safety Agency  
also provided training on Leadership in Patient Safety to  
154 non-executive trust board members from 113 trusts. 
CASE EXAMPLE 2
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
Situation: The work of theatre teams at the Royal Cornwall 
Hospitals NHS Trust requires a high degree of co-ordination and 
communication to maintain effectiveness and safety. A typical 
theatre team does not come together in its entirety until the first 
surgical operation is underway and will often disperse as the last 
patient leaves theatre.
Action: Two anaesthetists at the Trust were interested in human 
factors research in other industries and its application to 
healthcare. They therefore asked a medical educationalist to 
conduct ethnographic observation of theatre teams. The NHS 
Clinical Governance Support Team provided the educational 
resources for induction to human factors for an entire operating 
theatre complex. Following this, the National Patient Safety 
Agency agreed to fund work to identify a routine formal approach 
to team briefing and debriefing to improve communication and 
enhance teamwork. QinetiQ (the former Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency) were engaged to work with the Trust to develop 
a team self-review process (a form of structured debriefing that 
assists surgical teams in collective reflection on their performance). 
The process aims to improve teamwork behaviours which then 
translates to improved team performance and risk reduction for 
the patient. Acknowledging positive behaviour encourages teams 
to explore solutions internal to the team.
Outcome: Initially, personnel were self-conscious during the 
briefings, though overall they have reacted positively to the 
self-review concept. The team discusses issues around team 
management, safe practice and shared situational understanding 
at the self-review meetings. In the first week of using team 
self-review in the theatres, over 80 learning points emerged. A 
number of these were ‘actioned’, particularly those which were 
minor and cost-free. For example, identification that there should 
be a laminated MRSA policy placed on the theatre door when an 
MRSA patient is in theatre. 
Preliminary research undertaken by the Theatre Team Resource 
Management Team at the Royal Cornwall Hospital found that 
staff in the theatre complex exposed to team self-review showed 
statistically significant improvement in teamwork climate and 
some improvement in the safety climate (using the Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire, a reliable and formally validated research tool 
used in over 350 hospitals worldwide) than staff who were 
not offered debriefs or did not attend. Other domains of stress 
recognition, working conditions, management perceptions and 
job satisfaction showed little or no change, possibly explained by 
the fact that the Trust was going through extensive reorganisation 
at the time.
We funded further research by the Trust to evaluate the long 
term impacts and benefits of team self-review. The Staff Attitude 
Questionnaire data identified that:
n	 briefing and debriefing had a positive impact on non-
technical skills and patient safety; 
n	 pre-session briefing was important for safety and effective 
team management (those interviewed reported that the 
process improved teambuilding and communication, and 
enhanced preparation and anticipation of potential problems 
for theatre lists); and
n	 debriefing was valued as a process by which the teams could 
learn from problems encountered during lists and plan how 
care could be improved in the future. 
Although time restrictions and additional pressing commitments 
have limited universal uptake, theatre staff have endorsed the 
concept of briefing and debriefing and extension of the team 
self-review process.
Source: National Audit Office
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY
part one
17
1.15 In our 2003 report on achieving improvements 
through clinical governance4 we noted that clinical 
governance had improved the way that trusts dealt with 
quality of care issues and trust boards had started to 
become more involved in clinical concerns. Most trusts 
have continued to develop the quality agenda through 
the implementation of clinical governance arrangements 
and our 2004 survey revealed that 42 per cent of 
chief executives ranked the Commission for Health 
Improvement’s Clinical Governance reviews as the most 
significant driver for the board to improve patient safety. 
Where trust boards had become more engaged with 
patient safety, improvements had also been driven by 
the need to gain assurance to sign off the Statement on 
Internal Control and their self-assessment for the Controls 
Assurance Standards or to secure lower contributions to 
the NHS Litigation Authority to cover negligence claims. 
1.16 The National Patient Safety Agency has identified 
the need to be seen as a leader in its field and has 
employed well-respected clinical staff to lead on key areas 
and specialties. Most trusts’ contact with the National 
Patient Safety Agency has been through the Patient Safety 
Managers assigned to the 28 strategic health authorities. 
However, in a survey18 77 per cent of junior doctors 
said they needed more information about the National 
Patient Safety Agency and 60 per cent did not know of, 
or were unsure of an organisation with a specific remit to 
improve patient safety. The National Patient Safety Agency 
launched a webcast campaign to combat this, fronted by 
Professor Sir John Lilleyman, former President of the Royal 
College of Pathologists and vice-chairman of the Academy 
of Medical Royal Colleges. The follow-up survey showed 
that 70 per cent of respondents still needed to know more 
about the National Patient Safety Agency and 18 per cent 
were unaware of its existence.
Staff are now more involved in improving 
patient safety
1.17 Staff were generally positive about the priority given 
to patient-focused care by their employer6 but vision and 
leadership alone are insufficient. Hippocrates’ golden rule 
that healers should “first, do no harm” remains a central 
tenet of NHS healthcare. Individual staff need therefore to 
take responsibility for patient safety and be accountable 
for their actions. The professional bodies and Royal 
Colleges were concerned that once staff had filled in an 
incident report they were abrogating further responsibility 
for the patient safety incident to the recipient of the report. 
As a result the Royal Colleges have begun to place greater 
emphasis on patient safety in their curricula, for example 
the new Modernising Medical Careers initiative gives 
much greater prominence to behaviours that are intended 
to improve patient safety. In future junior doctors will have 
to demonstrate their competence in communication and 
consultation skills, clinical governance and team working. 
And a number of universities are currently piloting  
patient safety modules in their medical undergraduate 
degree courses. The professional regulatory bodies  
have also been strongly emphasising the individual 
responsibility of clinicians for patient safety through their 
Fitness to Practise schemes.
1.18 This emphasis may be paying dividends as  
93 per cent of directors of patient safety reported that 
relevant staff groups played a role in identifying patient 
safety priorities and in the design and development of 
solutions in their trusts. However, few trusts provide 
incentives for staff to improve patient safety; only  
16 per cent told us they used incentives for managers 
and 15 per cent for clinical staff. Most trusts agreed that 
detailed job descriptions, staff appraisal and 360 degree 
feedback exercises were the key tools for focusing staff  
on improving patient safety. 
Chief executives involvement in patient safety
The Chief Executive and most of the executive management team 
at Staffordshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust consider that 
the best way of demonstrating leadership and involvement in 
the patient safety agenda is to “walk the walk”. They therefore 
go out on call with their paramedics. Staff that we interviewed 
felt positively about this direct involvement. The Chief Executive 
personally writes to members of staff when they save lives and 
meets with families affected by a serious patient safety incident 
occurring whilst their relative was in the care of the Trust.
At Wirral Hospital NHS Trust the Chief Executive has re-defined 
the Trust’s arrangements for patient safety and invested in the 
infrastructure. He personally chairs the Clinical Governance 
Council which has agreed new standards and the Trust has a 
rolling programme to audit nursing standards. He performance 
managed the Trust’s achievement of Level 3 for the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts. 
The Chief Executive at South Staffordshire Healthcare NHS Trust 
has engaged Aston University to conduct team health checks 
against patient safety research evidence. He also established 
robust structures and processes for patient safety and improved 
access to training.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 1
Source: National Audit Office Survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts 2004
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1.19 The National Patient Safety Agency has been 
collaborating with organisations representing NHS 
staff and produced tools to promote awareness and 
understanding of patient safety (Appendix 6). Some trusts 
are using the National Patient Safety Agency’s induction 
video and there are e-learning projects in the pipeline 
(Case example 3).
Most trusts have improved their 
patient safety environment in 
response to risk management 
requirements
1.20 For the NHS to be safety conscious the Department 
advocated that trusts become, and remain, aware of 
potential risks so that they were in a position to take 
action to mitigate them before patient safety incidents 
occur. We developed an objective measure to assess 
trusts’ relative performance with regards to reporting and 
learning from patient safety incidents based on responses 
to key questions in our survey (Appendix 2). 
1.21 Our results showed that the majority of trusts have 
made substantial progress in introducing a patient safety 
focused environment. No trust obtained a perfect score. 
Three trusts achieved a score of over 90 per cent, while 
two trusts achieved a score of just 33 per cent. The average 
score was 67 per cent. Most trusts are reactive in their 
approach to patient safety, only taking action following an 
incident or near miss. A few trusts have achieved the stage 
where managing risk is an integral part of everything the 
organisation does (Case example 4 overleaf). 
1.22 These findings are backed up by the results of trusts’ 
self-assessment against the Risk Management System 
Controls Assurance Standard (one of 22 standards that 
formed part of the NHS Controls Assurance project). 
Ten per cent of chief executives ranked this as the biggest 
driver for their board to improve patient safety. Trusts had 
to undertake self-assessment against criteria such as board 
accountability, adverse incident reporting and complaints 
and claims handling. During the years it was in operation 
the assurance scores for acute, ambulance and mental 
health trusts rose from an average compliance of  
52 per cent in 1999-2000 to 87 per cent in 2003-04, 
showing that trusts are gradually moving towards a 
comprehensive risk management process. 
1.23 From inception in 2000, the eight criteria contained 
in the Risk Management System standard were the same as 
those used by the NHS Litigation Authority for the purposes 
of the Risk Pooling Schemes for Trusts. Independent 
assessors, working on behalf of the NHS Litigation 
Authority to evaluate clinical and non-clinical risk 
management under the Clinical Negligence Scheme for 
Trusts and Risk Pooling Schemes for Trusts, found that year 
on year trusts have continued to improve their compliance 
with the assessment criteria. Twenty-six per cent of chief 
executives ranked NHS Litigation Authority standards and 
evaluations as the chief driver for their board to improve 
patient safety because the higher their effectiveness rating 
and level of compliance with the standards, the greater the 
discount on their contributions to the Schemes (one trust 
has managed to reduce its contributions by £750,000). 
Involving Doctors with the Patient Safety Agenda
Situation: Doctors.net.uk was set up in 1998 to facilitate 
communication between doctors and to provide links to policies 
and guidance for all specialties. Eighty per cent of all registered 
doctors in the United Kingdom, from all specialties within 
the health sector, are members. Doctors.net.uk offers online 
learning modules which can count towards doctors’ personal 
development plans and it identified that junior doctors starting 
hospital placements could benefit greatly from additional 
training to reduce the risks to the safety of their patients.
Action: It commissioned 24 modules, under the title of 
the Clinical Foundation Programme, directly related to 
specific areas of junior doctors’ responsibilities, such as 
Abnormal blood results (and what to do), Drugs dosage 
and administration, Good medical records and Is your 
hospital safe? The Medical Protection Society sponsored the 
programme, offering a 50 per cent discount on joining fees for 
those junior doctors who passed ten of the modules. Although 
mainly aimed at house officers it is available for senior house 
officers as well. The programme commenced in August 2003, 
with two modules launched each month and all accredited 
modules were available by July 2004. 
Outcome: There has been a high uptake of the programme by 
junior doctors. Between August 2003 and July 2004, 4,671 
doctors passed 10,780 modules and almost 3,000 others began 
at least one module. The most popular topics were Work life 
balance and Basic blood gas analysis. Given the positive 
response, there will be further modules offered relating to patient 
safety incidents and reporting and learning lessons from them. 
The National Patient Safety Agency commissioned this work and 
it will revolve around a patient safety incident scenario.
CASE EXAMPLE 3
Source: National Audit Office
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Figure 4 shows the ratings for acute and mental health 
trusts for 2004-05 as compared with 2003-04 (a specific 
ambulance assessment was introduced in 2004-05 and 
so comparatives have not been included) and Appendix 7 
gives details of the assessment criteria.
1.24 From April 2005, all trusts and other providers of 
NHS healthcare were expected to comply with a new 
performance framework. Standards for Better Health 
provides a common set of requirements to ensure that 
health services are safe and of acceptable quality; and 
a framework for continuous improvement in the overall 
quality of care that people receive. The Healthcare 
Commission has responsibility for assessing trusts’ 
performance against seven domains with both core  
(where compliance is not optional) and developmental 
standards. The first domain is Safety (Appendix 7).
1.25 As with Controls Assurance, the onus is on healthcare 
organisations to ensure that they are meeting the expected 
standards of performance. On 31 October 2005, trust 
boards will make a draft declaration on the extent to  
which they are meeting the core standards; identifying 
areas where they are at risk of not meeting them; and  
any action they propose to take to address the risks.  
They will supplement this with comments from their 
patient and public involvement forum, local overview 
and scrutiny committee and strategic health authority. 
The Healthcare Commission will check these declarations 
against a wide range of surveillance information and follow 
up were there are concerns. In subsequent years trusts will 
be expected to make a declaration on performance against 
both the core and developmental standards. 
4 NHS Litigation Authority Year End Assessment Results for 2003-04 and 2004-05 
Source: NHS Litigation Authority
Hospital Trusts Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts General  Risk Pooling Scheme for Trusts
 Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 0 Level 1
End of 2004-05 0% 74% 22% 4% 0.4% 99.6%
End of 2003-04 5% 74% 19% 2% 15% 85%
For the first time since inception of the Scheme, all 239 NHS hospital (acute and mental health) trusts have achieved at least Level 1 of the 
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts general assessment and only one had yet to reach Level 1 for the Risk Pooling Schemes for Trusts. 





Joined the Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts (CNST) and 
started work on improving 
patient safety and becoming  
a leader in the field. 
1996 1997 1998 1999
Set up Clinical Risk Group. It receives 
monthly clinical incident reports, 
discusses trust-wide implications, 
makes recommendations and 
considers educational requirements.
All new clinical 
procedures discussed with 
patient safety team.
January 
Achieved CNST Level 1 
Autumn 
First trust to reach CNST Level 2
Introduced the central clinical equipment library 
to ensure better management of equipment 
and improve patient safety. Working database 
established to ensure all equipment complied  
with required standards. Presented opportunity 
to start standardising devices to reduce the 
possibility of staff using equipment with which 
they were unfamiliar.
First patient safety 
advisor appointed
Head of patient safety team starts 
sharing examples of good practice 
with other trusts who contacted her. 
Trust board issued their statement on risk management 
and reporting incidents in all payslips. This statement is 
issued annually: 
“the view of the board is that disciplinary action should 
not form part of the response to a report of an incident. 
However, it is important staff are aware this may not be 
possible in cases where…”
Head of the patient safety team appointed 
and the Director of Nursing was given 
executive board responsibility. They were 
the key drivers in bringing patient safety to 
the forefront. 
Head of patient safety starts 
meetings with new consultants 
to outline the Trust’s policy for 
patient safety reporting and their 
fair-blame culture. 
Introduced risk reminders leaflet which includes 
examples about specific topics, such as reporting 
faulty equipment and completing blood samples 
request forms correctly, and important issues 
arising from trends in reported incidents.
Mandatory induction training 
introduced. It outlines the Trust’s risk 
management strategy. All training 
programmes, including updates, cover 
filling in a patient safety incident form, 
explain the grading of incidents and 
have examples of adverse clinical 
events. Emphasis placed on fair  
blame culture and lessons learnt.
Clinical Governance 
Committee, a 
subgroup of the Trust 
Board, is set up.
Timeline for Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
Source: National Audit Office
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Second patient safety 
advisor appointed
A subgroup of the Clinical Risk Group is set up 
to review each feature of CNST standards and 
to ensure speciality/directorate action plans are 
developed and delivered. Members also carry 
out a clinical risk assessment of their speciality/
directorate with a patient safety advisor. 
Clinical claims 
handler appointed.
First internal risk 
assessment carried out 
by each directorate to 
identify and manage risk. 
Increase in incidents due to delay in the review 
of radiological reports. An investigation was 
carried out by the patient safety team and the 
imaging manager which resulted in a new set 
of procedures to evidence that imaging reports 
had been reviewed. A benchmarking audit 
followed to ensure this new procedure was 
being complied with. It will be repeated again 
in six months. 
Third patient safety 
advisor appointed




the first to reach 
CNST Level 3 
in both general 
and maternity 
services.
Weekly incident review meetings commenced attended by 
matrons of all directorates, members from the patient safety 
team and allied health professionals to talk through any patient 
safety issues. The group discusses progress on outstanding 
actions and raises any issues from new incidents during the last 
week. It is also an opportunity for members to share new ideas 
and solutions from their directorates/specialities, cascade 
information from audits triggered by incidents and bulletins.
Introduced internal clinical 
alerts to highlight very serious 
issues. An alert based on 
blood transfusion policies was 
produced after a significant 
near miss. 




Local reporting has improved but there have been 
delays in establishing an effective national system
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2.1 “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it” is 
a key message for patient safety. An organisation with 
a memory1 identified a lack of robust comprehensive 
information as the reason why the NHS was failing 
to learn the lessons of past events. It presented the 
first national estimates of the number of incidents of 
unintended harm, estimating that one in ten admitted 
patients experienced some form of harm, costing the 
NHS £2 billion. To this must be added approximately 
£430 million paid out each year in settlement of clinical 
negligence claims and the £1 billion cost of hospital 
acquired infection19. Estimates suggest around half 
of these incidents could have been prevented2. The 
Department’s response, Building a safer NHS for patients3, 
detailed plans to establish unified mechanisms for 
reporting and analysing information on errors and the 
need to agree definitions. 
2.2 This Part of the report examines the capacity of trusts 
to collect information locally on patient safety incidents 
and their ability to identify patterns and trends. We also 
assessed the NHS’s progress against the objectives and 
targets set out in Building a safer NHS for patients3, 
including the implementation of a national reporting 
system for learning and the progress against the targets to 
reduce four specific high risk or frequently occurring types 
of incidents. 
All trusts have organisation-wide 
patient safety reporting systems
2.3 Research on the characteristics of effective local 
incident reporting systems suggests that they should 
ideally be integrated, confidential and collect information 
on incident severity and risk. Our survey showed that 
97 per cent of trusts operate a reporting system that 
records both clinical and non-clinical incidents. In 
2004, 63 per cent of trusts had a confidential incident 
reporting system and 36 per cent had an open reporting 
system. By 2005, many more trusts had moved to open 
reporting systems (34 per cent had a confidential system 
and 63 per cent an open system). In addition 38 per cent 
of trusts had facilities to enable staff to report concerns 
through an anonymous reporting route, such as a 
whistle-blowing hotline, or for specific incidents such as 
medication errors. 
The total number of incidents reported has 
risen year on year
2.4 Fifty-six per cent of trusts told us that reporting of 
incidents was much more common amongst their staff, 
following a slow and steady development of a patient 
safety culture. A few trusts had made the reporting of 
incidents mandatory with a disciplinary procedure if 
a member of staff had witnessed an incident but not 
reported it. In the National NHS Staff Survey 20046, 
85 per cent of staff said their employer encouraged 
reporting of errors, near misses and incidents.
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2.5 As expected, the number of incidents reported annually to trusts’ incident 
reporting systems has increased, which suggests that most trusts have made 
progress in creating a culture in which staff are prepared to report (78 per cent 
of trusts told us that their encouragement of staff to report had had a positive 
impact on the number of incidents reported). 
2.6 In response to our 2004 survey, trusts reported that in 2003-04 they  
had recorded some 885,832 incidents and near misses (data provided by  
256 trusts). In our 2005 re-survey, data from 212 trusts indicated that for  
2004-05, 758,528 incidents and near misses were recorded (the average 
(median) increase reported by trusts was four per cent suggesting that the total 
number of reported incidents and near misses in 2004-05 is likely to be around 
973,560). A year on year comparison of incidents is difficult as many trusts 
have changed their systems and therefore were only able to provide full data 
for the last two years. Nevertheless, an analysis of the average number of 
incidents per 1,000 staff shows that since 2001-02 the number of reported 
incidents and nears misses has increased by 24 per cent (Figure 5). The 
Department told us that it welcomed this increase in numbers as it showed  
a more complete coverage of reports from across the NHS.
2.7 The increase in reported incidents across the NHS is also demonstrated  
by comparing the median number of reported incidents per trust over the last 
three years (1,954 in 2001-02, 2,511 in 2002-03, 2,946 in 2003-04 and  
3,184 in 2004-05). Nevertheless, there are still wide variations in the number 
of reported incidents per type of trust (Figure 6). 
5 Number of reported incidents and near misses per 1,000 members of 
staff in each reporting year by type of trust
Source: National Audit Office survey of 267 NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2004 
and National Audit Office update survey of 211 acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2005 
with results extrapolated to the same trust that responded in 2004
The number of incidents reported per 1,000 members of staff has increased year on 













































Percentage increase  
since 2001-2002
Total number of  
incidents reported
NOTE
* indicates insufficient responses to make comparisons.
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There is a wide variation in reported incidents and near misses both between similar NHS trusts and the different types of trusts. 
Ambulance trusts, given the nature of their role, have significantly fewer incidents reported than either mental health or acute trusts. 
Number of incidents (2003-041) (000s) 
Number of incidents (2004-052) (000s) 
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2004 (responses from 256 trusts)
Source: National Audit Office re-survey of NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2005 (responses from 212 trusts)
NOTES
1 2003-04: Reported incidents in acute trusts ranged from 94 to 16,186; in ambulance trusts from 6 to 770 and mental health trusts 4 to 9,196.
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2.8 The National Patient Safety Agency suggests that over 
time it would expect the total number of reported incidents 
to increase to facilitate learning but the number of severe 
incidents should decline. Most trusts began to use the 
National Patient Safety Agency definitions of severity in 
2004-05. In our 2004 survey, only 22 per cent of trusts 
were able to provide us with information on severity for all 
their reported incidents whereas in our 2005 re-survey of 
incidents in 2004-05, this had increased to 35 per cent of 
trusts. Given the emphasis on encouraging reporting, to 
date the numbers of all types of reported incidents are 
increasing (Figure 7). In our survey those trusts that graded 
incidents reported that they had records of 2,181 death 
incidents for the year ended March 2005 (90 per cent of 
trusts graded incidents by severity and 58 per cent of trusts 
graded incidents using severity, likelihood of recurrence 
and likely consequences of recurrence). 
2.9 Retrospective studies of hospital case records in 
countries such as the United States and Australia have 
shown a substantial rate of adverse events (Appendix 4).  
In England, there is limited national information on the 
severity and outcome of adverse patient safety incidents 
and published estimates vary widely. In 1999 a 
retrospective review2 of 1,014 medical and nursing 
records from two acute hospitals in London found that 
110 (10.8 per cent) of patients experienced an adverse 
event, about half of which were judged to have been 
preventable with ordinary standards of care. A third of 
these events were judged to have led to moderate 
impairment (19 per cent) or permanent impairment  
(6 per cent) or death (8 per cent). These adverse incidents 
resulted in some 999 extra bed days of which 460 were 
judged to be preventable, and which would have saved 
the two trusts £290,268 in direct costs. 
To date reported incidents in all categories are increasing.
Total number reported (000s)
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2004
NOTE
Based on 
responses from the 
58 trusts that were 
able to provide us 
with data on 
numbers of 
incident by grade 
for each year.
Moderate
Severe harm and death
Total
No harm and low
2001 - 2002 2002 - 2003 2003 - 2004
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2.10 The above pilot study is widely quoted as providing 
the best information currently available on patient outcomes 
as a result of adverse patient safety events. Since then 
various publications on patient safety have applied the 
findings to derive a national figure for deaths and permanent 
disabilities. For example in 2001, the Department’s draft 
guidance Doing Less Harm suggested that patient  
safety incidents may have contributed to as many as  
25,000 permanent disabilities and 34,000 deaths each year 
and, in Seven steps to patient safety11, which superceded 
Doing Less Harm, the National Patient Safety Agency 
estimated that there may be as many as 72,000 incidents 
which may have contributed to the death of patients, 
although it was unclear what proportion of this number 
would die as a direct result of the incident.
2.11 Improvements in trusts’ reporting systems means that 
more exact figures of the number of actual reported deaths 
due to patient safety incidents is now beginning to 
emerge. The National Patient Safety Agency’s first Patient 
Safety Observatory report in July 20055 reported that 
between December 2004 and March 2005, the National 
Patient Safety Agency received some 79,220 reports of 
patient safety incidents from acute, ambulance and mental 
health trustsg (a further 6,122 incidents were reported by 
primary care trusts making a total of 85,342 patient safety 
incidents reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System up to March 2005), of which 68 per cent resulted 
in no harm to patients. It estimated, based on 46 deaths 
reported by 18 trusts over a three months period, that 
there would have been some 840 deaths as a result of a 
patient safety incident in acute hospitals in England. We 
found that deaths and serious harm are likely to be under 
reported, suggesting that further work is needed to arrive 
at a more precise figure.
The extent of the reporting of near misses is 
much lower than expected
2.12 Some trusts did not distinguish between near misses 
and incidents but our survey results revealed that although 
the reporting of near misses had increased annually, there 
are still far fewer near misses reported than incidents (the 
total number in 2004-05 was 115,820). In 2001-02, only 
52 per cent of trusts reported more than 100 near misses; 
this had increased to 73 per cent (out of 161 who did 
distinguish between incidents and near misses) in 2004-05.
2.13 The ratio of incidents to near misses reported is useful 
in assessing how far an organisation has developed a robust 
reporting culture. There is a lot of variation between trusts, 
with between four and ten times more incidents reported 
than near misses; for acute trusts the ratio is 5:1, for 
ambulance trusts 1.5:1 and for mental health trusts 11:1. 
An organisation with a memory1 stated that the health of a 
reporting system can be judged by the proportion of minor 
incidents reported to more serious incidents reported; 
suggesting that for every serious accident there will be  
29 minor accidents and 300 occasions when the accident 
could have happened but for some reason was avertedh. 
Statistical analysis also showed that the more that staff 
believe that their incident reporting system is fair, the  
closer the ratio of incidents to near misses.
2.14 Some trusts have developed a Close-Call reporting 
system, separate from the main incident reporting system, 
to capture information on situations that could have 
resulted in an accident, injury or illness but did not, due to 
chance or timely intervention. All reporters are guaranteed 
anonymity and forms typically take fewer than five minutes 
to complete. Although this has maximised the trusts’ 
opportunities for learning from near misses to improve 
patient safety, it does mean that these incidents may not be 
fully recorded in the trusts’ incident reporting system and 
consequently in the national collation of incidents.
Under-reporting persists to varying degrees 
between staff groups and trusts 
2.15 Thirty-five per cent of executive directors of patient 
safety told us that under-reporting of patient safety 
incidents was a moderate problem, with two per cent 
stating it was a major problem for their trust. Most  
(93 per cent) trusts had attempted to estimate the 
proportion of incidents and near misses reported and they 
told us that on average around 22 per cent of incidents 
went unreported and 39 per cent of near misses  
(Figure 8). Similarly, in the National NHS Staff Survey 
20046, healthcare workers said of those patient safety 
incidents they had witnessed, someone reported it in  
83 per cent of cases. 
g The total should increase as the number of organisations that report increases, as staff send reports direct to the National Reporting and Learning System and 
more importantly, as an open culture becomes more wide spread within organisations so that more staff feel able to report incidents.
h Heinrich, when investigating factory accidents in the 1940s identified this 1:29: 300 ratio.
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2.16 Research indicates that certain types of incident are 
more likely to be under-reported. In our visits to trusts, 
managers pointed out that staff were less fearful about 
reporting a patient fall, as in many cases the attributed 
cause was not direct staff action. In contrast, medication 
errors and adverse drug reactions were under-reported due 
to fears of repercussions and these incidents were often 
complex and multi-factorial in nature (a fact that is 
supported by research findings). Also staff on wards 
suggested that, as under-reporting of medication errors 
was an acknowledged problem, one solution might be  
to have an anonymous reporting system for drug related 
incidents. Indeed, in a number of trusts staff can report 
direct to the pharmacy or there is anonymous reporting  
for drug related incidents in addition to the trust-wide 
incident reporting system (Illustrative example 2). Whilst 
this goes against the premise of an open reporting culture, 
it does allows managers to respond to recurrent problems. 
2.17 Seventy-seven per cent of trusts told us that under-
reporting by medical staff was a problem, whereas only 
eleven per cent believed under-reporting was a problem 
amongst nurses. Executive directors of patient safety 
considered that this was partly due to doctors expecting 
the nurse to report the error. 
2.18 In a Doctors.net.uk survey of 3,314 doctors working 
in secondary care20, 78 per cent acknowledged that they 
had made a mistake which had an impact on patient care, 
but only 19 per cent said that they had reported an error 
through the trust or the General Medical Council. Just  
17 per cent stated that most often they would report 
through those systems. Ninety-seven per cent of 
respondents agreed that a system, which was not operated 
by either trusts or a Departmental organisation, as for 
example happens in the rail and aviation industries 
(Appendix 3), which allowed them to report electronically 
and receive feedback anonymously, would encourage 
reporting. However, this would segregate a key staff group 
and undermine moves towards an open and fair reporting 
culture. Some trusts we visited had achieved high levels of 
incident reporting amongst doctors by allowing them to 
report in different ways, (with the information being fed 
into the main reporting system at a later date); providing 
feedback on every report and promoting awareness of the 
open and fair culture. Case example 5 illustrates a 
national initiative to improve reporting by doctors.
Staff are more likely to report actual incidents than near misses.
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health Trusts 2005 
NOTES
1 Based on 201 trusts.








Actual incidents1 that go unreported
Near misses2 that go unreported







NHS trusts’ best estimates of the proportion of 
actual incidents and near misses which go 
unreported
8
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2.19 Staff often cite fear of reprisal as a barrier to 
reporting but there are many other factors which 
discourage healthcare workers from reporting patient 
safety incidents. Our findings in our report on clinical 
governance4 identified that some of the most significant 
barriers to incident reporting were culture (56 per cent), 
lack of resources (23 per cent) and problems with 
information (14 per cent trusts). These were very similar to 
the responses to our survey in 2004 (Figure 9 overleaf).
Almost all new staff receive training on 
incident reporting, but it is less likely to be 
given to existing employees, temporary staff 
and contractors 
2.20 Most trusts maintained staff awareness of the need to 
report through at least one method such as update training 
and staff communication and appraisal systems. Education 
and training is essential if staff are to be encouraged to 
report and we found that 97 per cent of trusts trained new 
employees on what, when and how to report. However, 
there were less comprehensive methods for making 
temporary staff and contractors aware of patient safety 
reporting requirements (Figure 10). Trusts identified a 
number of barriers to training together with solutions 
aimed at improving matters (Figure 11).
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 2
Using anonymous reporting systems for medication errors
In 1993 King’s College Hospital established an anonymous 
medication error reporting scheme called Sure-Med. Prior to 
this Pharmacy had little knowledge of the types or numbers 
of medication errors occurring in the trust. Errors identified 
were reported to Pharmacy via a specific telephone line in the 
Medicines Information Department. Reports were reviewed by 
a multidisciplinary group who issued alerts and newsletters 
highlighting problem drugs or practices. During the first year 
the reporting rate averaged between 30 and 50 errors per 
quarter. By 2001 Pharmacy had reviewed over 600 reported 
medication errors allowing themes and trends to be identified 
and information to prevent recurrence of common errors to be 
disseminated to staff.
Source: National Audit Office survey of acute, ambulance and mental 
health trusts 2004
The National Patient Safety Agency and Doctors.net.uk
Situation: There is a perception within the Health Service that 
doctors are less likely to report a patient safety incident than, 
for example, a nurse.
Action: The National Patient Safety Agency has tried to target 
awareness of the patient safety agenda and it commissioned 
Doctors.net.uk. to communicate electronically with their 
members. For example, anaesthetists and surgeons received 
a link to the Correct Site Surgery safety alert and further 
information on the National Patient Safety Agency website. 
Doctors.net.uk also conducted a survey of junior doctors 
regarding the reasons why they might not report a patient 
safety incident and to assess their knowledge and awareness 
of the National Patient Safety Agency. Two hundred and 
ninety-two junior doctors replied and the main reasons given 
for choosing not to report a patient safety incident were: 
‘don’t have time’; ‘don’t think it will make a difference’; and 
‘don’t believe I will get any feedback’. Also 72 per cent were 
undecided as to whether the National Patient Safety Agency 
would improve patient safety. 
Outcome: The National Patient Safety Agency planned a 
campaign to address the issues identified and Professor  
John Lilleyman asked for junior doctors’ assistance with 
reporting. Doctors.net.uk found in a follow-up survey of  
189 doctors that the percentage of junior doctors who thought 
that the National Patient Safety Agency would improve patient 
safety had increased from 13 per cent to 34 per cent as a result 
of the online information campaign. The percentage of doctors 
indicating that they would definitely or be likely to use the 
National Patient Safety Agency’s anonymous online reporting 
form increased from 36 per cent to 48 per cent of the sample.
CASE EXAMPLE 5
Source: National Audit Office
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Feedback on extent and subsequent action  
is important
2.21 Ninety-nine per cent of trusts produced formal 
summarised patient safety incident reports for review and 
action, with 80 per cent on either a monthly or quarterly 
basis. Most contained analysis of incidents by category 
(91 per cent), trends (88 per cent) and directorate 
(81 per cent), though few analysed by frequency 
(63 per cent), ward (57 per cent) or specialty (52 per cent) 
and even fewer analysed by underlying causes 
(34 per cent). Illustrative example 3 shows how one trust’s 
system for analysing incidents has evolved. Although some 
trusts log patient complaints, claims and incidents onto 
the same risk management system, few actually analysed 
the inter-relationships of these data sources to identify 
unreported incidents.
2.22 Management feedback to staff who report patient 
safety incidents is also crucial in encouraging subsequent 
reporting, but from our survey we found no consistency of 
practice between trusts, even allowing for the different 
levels of maturity in safety culture. Half told staff how they 
would deal with their initial report and 83 per cent of trusts 
provided feedback after an investigation of the incident had 
taken place. As a reporting system and culture matures, 
providing individual feedback can become a substantial 
administrative burden and trusts need to target feedback at 
areas where there are the greatest risks.
9 Most frequently reported barriers to incident reporting
Source: National Audit Office
Incident 
occurs
The top five reasons given by trusts for under-reporting by staff were fear (19 per cent), poorly designed forms (15 per cent), lack of 
understanding about what to report (13 per cent), failure to recognise that an incident needed reporting (eleven per cent) and being too 









of form to risk 
management
Submits 
copy of form 
to direct 
manager










‘The forms are 
too complex for 
me to fill in’
STOP STOP
‘I need some help 
with inputting this’ STOP










‘I’m going to get  
the blame’
‘I’m just too busy at 
the moment’
‘How would I know 
that I needed to 
report it?’
‘The patient wasn’t 
harmed so why 
should I report?’
‘Nobody tells  
me anything  
even if I report’
Initial 
evaluation
‘I don’t know 




‘I’m just too busy 
to deal with this’
STOP
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY
part two
31




Not enough trainers  
 
Time
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts 2004
Common actions to address barriers
n Review of requirements and timing 
and delivery of training 
n Mandatory training days 
n CDRom/e-learning
n Review of training capacity, 
capability and delivery 
n Additional resources  
made available
n Business case for resources
n Review of training requirements, 
shift patterns and delivery
n CDRom/Intranet/e-learning
n Mandatory training 
n Training in the ward/department
There are a wide range of methods for ensuring that  
temporary and contract staff are aware of their reporting 
requirements for patient safety incidents in use, but many  
trusts relied on just one method.  
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts 2004
NOTE
58 trusts used only one method for temporary staff; 70 trusts used only 
one method for contract staff. 










Making temporary and contract staff aware of 
reporting requirements 
10
Trend analysis of underlying causes
West Middlesex University Hospital NHS Trust has been 
operating a common trust-wide incident reporting system that, 
for the past seven years, has included the reporting of ‘patient 
safety incidents’. Staff reported the details and underlying 
causes of the incidents confidentially using the Trust IR1 
form. However, in respect of clinical/patient safety incidents, 
nursing management and clinical leads felt that the standard 
periodic reports (generated using the computerised incident 
recording system), whilst producing statistical information, gave 
insufficient insight into the nature of the patient safety incidents 
or the ways in which patient outcomes might be improved.
In 2002, the Risk Facilitator set up a database linked to the 
incident recording system. This simplified and automated the 
production of quarterly reports, detailing clinical categories (as 
defined by the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts) against 
the reported underlying causes. The Trust’s Senior Management 
and the Directorates received these standard reports, with the 
Directorate Quality and Risk Committees being responsible for 
discussing the trends and underlying causes in detail. Members 
of the Risk Management Department team attended these 
Committees to give advice and monitor the responses to these 
reports. The Quality and Risk Committees also had to present 
at the bi-monthly Trust Governance Committee, and more 
recently, to provide a summary of actions taken for the quarterly 
“Incidents Update” bulletin so that learning was disseminated 
across the Trust.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 3
Source: National Audit Office
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Patient falls are more routinely reported  
than medication errors or adverse  
drug reactions
2.23 All trusts have a customised taxonomy for  
classifying incidents and there was a broad consensus 
amongst the different types of trusts that we surveyed  
as to the types of incidents most frequently reported. 
Patient injury, such as slips, trips and falls being most 
common (Figure 12).
2.24 Trusts can take steps to minimise risks, but some 
errors can never be fully eliminated from healthcare 
(Figure 13). For example, on wards where rehabilitation is 
an important part of recovery for elderly and vulnerable 
patients, it is difficult to eliminate all risk of them falling. 
In contrast, evidence indicates that automated processes 
reduce errors, for example computerised prescribing 
systems remove opportunities for documentation error 
(Illustrative example 4).
In 2000 An organisation with a 
memory identified weaknesses in 
the plethora of incident reporting 
systems used in the NHS
2.25 Traditionally external regulators, such as clinicians’ 
regulatory bodies and the Royal Colleges, and professional 
bodies have inspected and investigated when there were 
concerns about the safety of patients. For many years there 
have been National Confidential Enquiries into maternal 
death, perioperative death, stillbirths and infant death, and 
suicides and homicide by people with mental illness. 
There are also a number of long standing, voluntary 
reporting systems to collect data and encourage learning 
on specific types of patient safety incidents. For example, 
the Adverse Incident Reporting System for medical devices 
and the Yellow Card Scheme for routine monitoring of 
medicines safety. 
Patient injuries are the most frequent types of reported patient safety incident. 
Source: National Audit Office survey of acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2004
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Based on NHS data for 2003-2004.
Accident and emergency attendances: 16.5 million; Finished consultant episodes: 13 million; Patient journeys by ambulances: 18 million.
1.6% 
Frequency of incidents by type 12
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2.26 From 1996 under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases 
and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (1995), trusts 
have been statutorily obliged to report to the Health and 
Safety Executive any accidents resulting in the death, 
serious injury or incapacitation for more than three days. 
Also in 1996 the four United Kingdom blood services 
funded a scheme, established by a professionally led 
group known as SHOT, to collect information on serious 
hazards of transfusion. Since 1997, the Department has 
established other arm’s length organisations to monitor 
and review trusts performance on various aspects of 
patient safety. For example, NHS Estates operated a 
defects and failures reporting system (in April 2005 
responsibility transferred to the Department).
2.27 By the time of the Chief Medical Officer’s review1 
a wide range of reporting systems were in use, but they 
were fragmented and compliance with reporting was 
still patchy. His report concluded that there were several 
systematic weaknesses in data collection including:
n no consensus of what to report;
n different and potentially conflicting views on  
the purpose of patient safety incident reporting 
systems; and
n no proper linkages between reporting systems.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 4
Using automated processes to reduce errors
Aintree Hospitals NHS Trust has piloted and will be rolling out 
an automated patient identification system to reduce prescribing 
errors based on incorrect patient identification. The system uses 
a bar-coded wrist band, with the same bar code attached to 
all test results and observation notes. The pilot proved it was a 
cost-saving measure for the trust. 
Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust installed an automated 
dispensing robot in July 2004 as a risk reduction initiative. The 
automated dispenser has helped reduce dispensing picking 
errors and so has enhanced patient safety. The robot has also 
decreased dispensing turnaround times, improving patient 
throughput. As a result of the change, the pharmacy department 
has observed a reduction in picking errors, as well as an 
improvement in the working environment for dispensing staff.
Other industries successful use of simulators to teach skills that are 
difficult to acquire by traditional educational methods encouraged 
Barts and the London NHS Trust to use a clinical medicine 
simulator for training. The Trust has developed a one-day 
multidisciplinary emergency obstetric training course in which 
anaesthetists, obstetricians and midwives use a lifelike manikin 
that artificially duplicates conditions without risk to patients.
Source: National Audit Office survey of acute, ambulance and mental 
health trusts 2004
  
13 Perceived preventability of patient safety incidents
Source: National Audit Office literature review and visits to acute, ambulance and mental health trusts 2005
Staff perceive it is easier to reduce some types of patient safety incidents, especially if resources are limited.
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An organisation with a memory 
proposed a single focal point  
for information on patient  
safety incidents but this has  
not been achieved 
2.28 An organisation with a memory1 recommended that 
a direct, confidential, but not anonymous, national 
reporting scheme be introduced. Building a safer NHS for 
patients3 acknowledged the good work that the NHS had 
done to encourage local reporting, but identified a need 
for a mandatory, national reporting system for patient 
safety incidents and near misses which would be 
implemented and operated by a new independent body, 
the National Patient Safety Agency. 
2.29 The aim was that the system would “capture 
information from a wide variety of sources in order to 
detect national patterns, clusters or trends that could 
reduce risk or prevent the recurrence of incidents in the 
future”. The Department recognised that in establishing 
the National Patient Safety Agency to implement and 
operate the system, the same information on particular 
patient safety incidents would still need to be reported to 
a number of organisations. And since then other reporting 
mechanisms have also been introduced. 
2.30 Given this complex reporting environment and the 
different maturity of systems, the National Patient Safety 
Agency aimed to reduce the administrative burden on 
front line staff by exploring whether it could integrate 
reporting of medical device incidents to the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency with its own 
National Reporting and Learning System. However, during 
the testing and development phase of the project, it 
became clear the National Reporting and Learning System 
could not capture the detailed statutory data required by 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency. As there has been no integration of reporting 
forms, the National Reporting and Learning System added 
to the list of organisations to which trusts were already 
required to report and trusts still face an extremely 
complex system of reporting and investigation.  
Figure 14 overleaf shows the main national reporting 
systems, but around 30 routes still remain.
The national reporting scheme was rolled out 
two years later than originally planned 
2.31 Building a safer NHS for patients3 proposed a new 
national reporting system for learning and envisaged that 
by December 2001, 60 per cent of trusts would be able 
to provide information to the system and that by the end 
of 2002 all NHS trusts, and a significant proportion of 
primary care trusts, would be providing information to the 
system. The system was envisaged as being:
n mandatory for individuals and organisations; 
n confidential, but open and accessible;
n generally blame free and independent;
n simple to use but comprehensive in coverage and 
data collection; and
n allow systems learning and change at local and 
national levels.
Healthcare organisations in other countries, having 
compared the merits of anonymous and confidential 
reporting, have generally opted for confidential reporting 
(Appendix 4). Other industries have also opted for 
confidential and not anonymous reporting systems 
(Appendix 3). Over time, as the aviation industry and 
some hospitals in the United States of America have 
embedded their systems, they have moved towards an 
open system of reporting. 
2.32 Following publication of Building a safer NHS for 
patients3 (and prior to the formation of the National 
Patient Safety Agency in July 2001) the Department 
conducted an Official Journal of the European 
Communities procurement exercise to establish a pilot 
project for the national reporting system for learning. This 
resulted in the Australian Patient Safety Foundation being 
awarded a contract to develop software for a central 
repository and Safecode (United Kingdom supplier of risk 
management systems to trusts) being engaged to work 
with the Australian Patient Safety Foundation to develop 
software to allow patient safety incident data (both the 
details of the incident and root cause analysis) to be 
extracted from local reporting systems. The pilot 
commenced in September 2001 in 28 trusts; an interim 
report was published in April 2002 and a final report in 
June 2002. 
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2.33 The report on the pilot concluded that it had been 
successful in identifying implications for the 
implementation of a national reporting system for learning 
across the NHS, although trusts had some difficulties 
capturing the root cause analysis data. The National Patient 
Safety Agency considered that the roll out of the pilot 
would be neither optimal nor cost effective due to the 
complexity of data extraction and data mapping problems. 
It therefore developed a Business Case with options 
ranging from “Do Nothing” to an in-house developed 
computerised national reporting and learning system. This 
latter option, with a revised, phased, implementation 
timetable between summer 2003 and December 2004, 
was subsequently agreed by the Department and approved 
by the Treasury in February 2003 (subject to close scrutiny 
of the e-Form integration with local risk management 
systems and the carrying out of peer reviews as suggested 
by the Office of Government Commerce).i
2.34 The approved option was to collect comprehensive 
data on patient safety incidents in NHS trusts and identify 
national trends in incidents, from which the National 
Patient Safety Agency could develop practical solutions for 
application across all local organisations. The National 
Reporting and Learning System either extracts information 
directly from trusts’ own incident reporting systems, which 
is then de-identified, or collects information from an 
anonymous electronic reporting form (e-Form). The cost in 
the business case was £9.4 million over seven years. As at 
March 2005, £5.5 million had been spent from a revised 
lifetime budget of £10.4 million (June 2004).
2.35 The National Patient Safety Agency’s decision to 
devise an anonymous reporting e-Form was based on the 
belief that assurances of confidentiality would not be 
enough to encourage clinicians too frightened to report 
and that there was a need for a safety net. Experience, at 
trusts where both anonymous and confidential systems 
work in parallel, has showed that less than ten per cent of 
all reported incidents are submitted anonymously. Some 
trusts told us that the potential for incidents to by-pass 
their own reporting systems would in their view 
undermine the progress they had made in establishing  
an open and fair culture. 
2.36 The National Patient Safety Agency believe the initial 
indications are that the e-reporting system will be a rich 
source of information for learning. Ninety-four per cent of 
the 108 reports received between September 2004 and 
March 2005 had the agreement of the reporter to share the 
information with the trust involved. Although still early,  
13 per cent of reports are from medical staff who generally 
may be less likely to report incidents locally.
2.37 Building a safer NHS for patients3 stated that the data 
requirements at local and national levels are different. 
Trusts need to know who reported the incident, to ensure 
no misinterpretation and to validate the information. In 
contrast, national reporting systems gather information 
about what, where, when, how and why things are likely 
to go wrong, what action is taken, the impact of the 
incident and what could have been done to prevent it, 
rather than identify the people involved. The majority of 
the data captured by the National Reporting and Learning 
System has come from local incident reporting systems 
and all trusts told us that it had already been analysed to 
identify learning. Ninety-nine per cent provided examples 
of such learning. Therefore the National Patient Safety 
Agency could have collected aggregate information on 
commonly occurring incidents that trusts knew about and 
used it to promulgate learning nationally, whilst focusing 
on the collection of information on less frequent incidents. 
2.38 An organisation with a memory1 envisaged the 
national collection of certain categories of data and 
Building a safer NHS for patients3 that definitions of 
incidents should gradually move to internationally  
agreed standards. To meet its objective of identifying and 
disseminating patient safety learning the National Patient 
Safety Agency decided not to limit its dataset and 
consequently the National Reporting and Learning System 
receives data on all incidents, regardless of their potential 
for national learning. And despite the existence of well 
developed international incident classification, the 
National Patient Safety Agency decided to define its own 
taxonomy for national reporting and produce tailored 
versions for use in nine different healthcare settings. 
However, reporting fields, which identify the contributory 
factors to the incident, are optional, and compliance is 
variable, even though the learning of lessons is most likely 
to come from this information. 
i As the focus of study is on reporting and learning to improve patient safety an audit of the procurement and implementation of the National Reporting and 
Learning System was out-with the scope of this study – the references herein are used to demonstrate the reason for the changes to the implementation 
timetable and the delay in the opportunity for national reporting and learning. 
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14 Organisations involved in collecting reports on patient safety incidents and near misses and encouraging learning 
from these incidents 
NOTES
1 The Department has now taken over NHS Estates responsibilities for the health and safety and environmental reporting.
2 Only for patients detained under the Mental Health Act.
3 Will only receive reports, conduct investigations, issue guidelines and alerts if there is significant risk or a claim has been received.
4 From November 2005 the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency assumes responsibility for Haemovigilance. The new system will  
provide a single data entry point for Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency and Serious Hazards Of Transfusion reports.
5 Data on those incidents involving licensed medicines or where a medical device is involved and a device fault needs to be ruled out.
Source: National Audit Office
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2.39 The full roll out of the National Reporting and 
Learning System commenced in September 2004, nearly 
two years later than the headline target in Building a safer 
NHS for patients3 (see paragraph 2.28). By end of 
December 2004, all trusts had the technology to link to 
the National Reporting and Learning System but not all 
had finished mapping their data sets. The revised target  
for all trusts to begin sending their data to the System was 
June 2005. By August 2005, at least 35 trusts still had  
not submitted any data to the National Reporting and 
Learning System.
2.40 Trusts have invested considerable time and resources 
to develop individual data mapping schemes in order to 
comply with, and to send data to, the National Reporting 
and Learning System (Appendix 5). Our survey in 2005 
showed that 12 per cent of trusts had no problems in 
linking to the National Reporting and Learning System. 
Eighty-two per cent of trusts reported problems, of which 
36 trusts said these were major, and these were due to 
time and resource issues (64 per cent and 46 per cent 
respectively) and software compatibility issues 
(39 per cent). We found that there was a significant 
relationshipj between the manufacturer of the trust’s 
incident reporting system and the ease with which the 
local and national data sets were integrated. 
The Department focused on improving levels 
of reporting and learning but evidence on 
progress against the specified high risk areas  
is patchy
2.41 The Department identified target reductions for  
four specific high risk areas which, despite a body of 

























































j Using a Chi-Squared test ( X2 = 43.09, df=22, p= 0.05).
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Position at July 2005 
In April 2001, the Department published a report on the 
prevention of intrathecal medication errors21 and a report 
on the adverse incident at Queen’s Medical Centre22 which 
identified serious systems failures. As a result all trusts that 
administered this form of chemotherapy were required  
to review their procedures and make sure that they  
were fully compliant with the National Guidance on the  
Safe Administration of Intrathecal Chemotherapy by  
31st December 2001. Trusts did not achieve full compliance 
until summer 2003 after interventions by the regional 
Directors of Public Health, the Chief Medical Officer and a 
health minister. The Department issued revised guidance in 
October 2003, which trusts finally self-reported compliance 
by January 2005. Although no further cases of mal-
administered vincristine have been reported in England 
since 2000, a national cancer peer review programme, 
which started in November 2004, found nine out of 19 trusts 
reviewed by April 2005 were not satisfactorily compliant, 
and three of them had reported compliance. This peer review 
is to continue over the next 18 months and the Department 
is working with strategic health authorities to help ensure 
that full implementation of guidance is maintained. In 
collaboration with the NHS Purchasing and Supplies Agency, 
the National Patient Safety Agency, and the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, the Department has 
set up a parallel project to identify design solutions to help 
prevent cross connection errors during spinal  
injection procedures.
Target 
Reduce to zero 
the number of 












Around 50 per cent of the NHS litigation bill relates to claims 
arising from childbirth and achieving the target reduction of  
25 per cent by 2005 could save as much as £50 million a 
year. Evidence from the NHS Litigation Authority suggests that 
the number of claims notified (by year of formal notification) 
have reduced by around 13 per cent from 1,210 in 2001-02 
to 1,051 in 2003-04. Projecting the trend across three years, 
to 2004-05, suggests a 20 per cent reduction compared to 
the 25 per cent target. Despite this improvement in relation  
to claims other research suggest that there are some concerns 
about maternity services which remain. For example, the 
Healthcare Commission’s investigations into maternity services 
have revealed serious failings in a number of common risk 
areas: risk management, working relationships, training  
and supervision, the environment and staff shortages.7,8  
The National Patient Safety Agency’s analysis of reports to 
the National Reporting and Learning System shows treatment 
incidents are most common in obstetrics and gynaecology. 
It will be developing solutions for women known to be at 
risk of maternal death or serious maternal morbidity where 
appropriate. Additionally, it will be reviewing system  
factors leading to operative complications during 
gynaecological surgery.
Reduce by 
25 per cent 
the number of 
instances of 
negligent harm 
in the field of 
obstetrics and 
gynaecology 








Position at August 2005 
(Report from NHS Trusts)
Only acute NHS trusts 
administer spinal injections. 
All trusts stated that there had 
been no incidents of fatalities 
from mal-administered 
injections. Thirteen stated 
that they had put new 
policies and procedures into 
place, and other trusts had 
improved training  
and guidance.
This target predominantly 
applied to acute NHS trusts. 
Out of the acute trusts that 
answered this question, 
just over half (55 per cent) 
could not state that they 
had achieved this target. 
However, the main reason 
cited was that previous 
under-reporting of incidents 
and the often substantial 
delay between incidents and 
the onset of litigation made 
progress towards this target 
impossible to assess. 
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15 Progress on the four specific targets identified in An organisation with a memory (continued)
Source: National Audit Office
March 
2002 
Six trusts failed to meet the deadline but by the end of 
May 2002 all trusts were reporting compliance. Overall, 
there has been a substantial fall in the number of inpatient 
suicides from 195 in 2000 to 156 in 2002 (20 per cent 
reduction). However, the National Confidential Inquiry 
into Suicide and Homicide by People with Mental Illness 
subsequently identified that suicides by hanging from non-
collapsible rails had not been completely eliminated (two 
cases may have occurred since 2002 but investigations 
are still ongoing). NHS Estates issued a further alert in 
November 2004 but four trusts are still working towards the 
replacement of these fittings.10
Reduce to zero 
the number 
of suicides by 
mental health 
inpatients as 
a result of 
hanging from 
non-collapsible 
bed or shower 














Position at July 2005 
Prescribing medicine is the most frequent treatment provided 
for patients in the NHS (200 million a year in hospitals alone) 
but incidents of medication error are still seriously under-
reported (paragraph 2.12). The Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency only receives reports on drug 
error as the result of adverse reactions to the medication 
and because of low reporting rates and the many barriers 
to reporting medication errors, the true extent of serious 
errors in the use of prescribed drugs is unknown. The Chief 
Pharmaceutical Officer’s 2004 report23 highlighted drugs and 
clinical settings that carry particular risks and identified models 
of good practice to reduce risk in the NHS. The National 
Patient Safety Agency has a programme of improving 
medication safety that has included patient safety alerts 
on potassium chloride and methotrexate. The Department 
and the Design Council jointly commissioned a report24 to 
produce practical recommendations for the NHS to improve 
patient safety through better procurement and design of 
packaging for medicines and medical devices. The National 
Patient Safety Agency and the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency have been working with drugs 




40 per cent 
the number of 
serious errors 







or dispensing  
of drugs 
Position at August 2005 
(Report from NHS Trusts)
Action regarding this target 
was mainly taken by acute 
and mental health trusts, 
with over 77 per cent of 
ambulance trusts stating that 
it did not apply to them.  
Of those trusts that stated that 
this target was applicable 
to them, only 20 per cent 
answered that they had 
met this target. Many trusts 
stated that this target was 
difficult to assess, often due 
to a lack of baseline data. 
The most common responses 
after this were that trusts 
were currently in the process 
of putting action plans into 
place, or that there were 
very few errors in the first 
place, making a 40 per cent 
reduction difficult.
All trusts that responded that 
they had had no suicides  
as a result of hanging from  
non-collapsible rails. 
Ten trusts stated that 
they currently have work 
underway to comply.




Systems for analysing and sharing lessons learned  
are in place but are largely under-used
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3.1 An organisation with a memory1 recognised that 
little systematic learning from patient safety incidents and 
service failures had taken place in the NHS and in most 
other countries. Designers, builders and those responsible 
for developing clinical procedures and protocols can 
unintentionally embed pre-conditions in the NHS which 
can cause harm to patients. While human error is often 
the most easily identifiable element in many serious 
patient safety incidents, it is only part of the explanation. 
More often than not the central issue is systemic: not who 
made the error but how and why the safety mechanisms 
failed and what helped to create the conditions in which 
the mistake occurred. Building a safer NHS for patients3 
therefore focused on the action, both nationally and 
locally, necessary to establish a system that ensures 
lessons from adverse events in one locality are learned 
across the whole NHS. 
3.2 This Part of the report examines the action taken by 
NHS trusts, the Department and other NHS organisations to 
improve patient safety through organisational learning. In 
particular through the use of information on patient safety 
incidents from investigations and other sources of data.
Good foundations have been laid for 
improving the quality and relevance 
of local incident investigations
All trusts now undertake in-depth analysis of 
incidents but capacity problems have limited 
the number conducted 
3.3 We found 59 per cent of trusts had been undertaking 
in-depth analysis of incidents to learn lesson for at least 
two years, with eight per cent of those having conducted 
analysis for more than seven years. We found that there 
was no systematic pattern as to how trusts determined 
what incidents required a detailed investigation.  
Eighty per cent told us that they based their decisions on  
a number of factors, including the severity of impact 
on the patient, frequency of incident type and potential 
risk to the trust or the patient. Our visits revealed the 
idiosyncratic ways some trusts decide which incidents 
require analysis. One trust told us that they assess the 
‘ooo-er factor’ of an incident – that is, whether an incident 
is serious, potentially serious or unusual and therefore 
may warrant further investigation. 
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3.4 Forty per cent of trusts were following the guidance 
on the need to carry out full analysis of all severe harm  
and death category incidents. Nine trusts told us that staff 
reported 50 or more of this type of incident during 2003-04 
and all but two trusts had investigated more than 
five per cent of these incidents. One of the reasons given 
for the lower number of investigations was that incidents 
were mis-graded to draw attention to a minor incident – 
one trust with a serious incident hotline told us it was used 
to report a doctor was missing, when he was not answering 
his bleep. Whilst most trusts raised the cost of in-depth 
investigations as a deterrent, few knew the actual cost.
3.5 There are wide variations in the way that trusts  
have developed their capacity to conduct these 
investigations. Whilst some trusts have as many as  
17 trained staff per hundred staff members, others  
have no-one trained to do in-depth analysis. One 
explanation for this variability is that in some trusts, 
a small number of staff act as facilitators for others to 
conduct the investigation, while in other trusts a large 
number of staff are trained to carry out investigations  
 but will rarely be called upon to do so. 
The National Patient Safety Agency’s tools 
have contributed to the improvement in the 
quality of investigations but more needs to be 
done to embed the concept and the lessons 
3.6 The National Patient Safety Agency introduced 
the root cause analysis toolkit to strengthen in-depth 
investigations and aid consistency. Trusts uptake of the 
toolkit was high, with 76 per cent of trusts in our 2004 
survey having actively encouraged its use. Sixty per cent of 
trusts changed their approach to in-depth investigations as 
a result of the work of the National Patient Safety Agency 
and of those, 23 per cent considered that they now have 
a better quality of investigation and 17 per cent had a 
more structured or consistent approach to an investigation. 
However, its use was limited in 37 per cent of trusts owing 
to time constraints. 
3.7 Improving trusts’ patient safety standards depends on 
the quality of the recommendations arising from the root 
cause analysis. Strategic health authorities told us that the 
quality of recommendations made by trusts was still very 
variable. In North East London they are addressing this 
through further programmes of training for preparation of 
reports from in-depth investigations. Staff also reported 
difficulties in getting recommendations actioned by 
organisations outside their own trust. 
3.8 As yet the National Patient Safety Agency does not 
collect information from trusts’ root cause analyses. The 
National Patient Safety Agency is scoping the possible 
options for collecting information on trusts’ root cause 
analysis which will enable it to identify national issues 
and promulgate lessons learned. 
3.9 Since 2002, the National Patient Safety Agency and 
the Royal Colleges have jointly appointed eleven national 
Clinical Specialty Advisors, representing most medical 
specialties. These clinicians support its work in identifying 
key patient safety priorities within and across the 
specialties and provide feedback to the colleges and other 
organisations, creating a two-way flow of information. 
Some Clinical Specialty Advisors have established External 
Multi-Professional Reference Groups, to validate work and 
recommendations, and to undertake a holistic analysis 
of the root causes of key patient safety incidents. Their 
intention is to help develop workable solutions for these 
incidents (Illustrative example 5).
In September 2003, the Clinical Specialty Advisor in 
Anaesthesia took up post on a one-day per week secondment to 
contribute and co-ordinate input to the National Patient Safety 
Agency about anaesthetic related issues. 
The Clinical Specialty Advisor recognises that there is no 
shortage of issues to be pursued, even within a specialty 
acknowledged to be a leader in aspects of safe practice. 
He has facilitated a risk assessment exercise of the whole 
anaesthetic process to look at the journey of an adult patient 
undergoing elective general surgery, from referral by general 
practitioner to the conclusion of anaesthesia. From this work, 
key areas of potential risk and patient harm have been 
identified, and these will form part of the initial agenda  
for the specialty reference group.
Other projects of note involving the National Patient Safety 
Agency in anaesthesia are: 
n the production of a report on Blocked Anaesthetic 
Tubing and the subsequent revision of the Association of 
Anaesthetists’ anaesthetic machine checklist, following the 
tragic accidental death of a child when an anaesthetic 
circuit became blocked;
n efforts to design out the risks of inadvertent spinal  
injections; and 
n work with manufacturers and clinicians to reduce the 
mis-administration of drugs through colour-coded labelling 
of ampoules and their boxes.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 5
Source: National Audit Office
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Trusts have identified and 
implemented lessons from 
incidents but few knew of the 
cost-effectiveness of the interventions
3.10 In their responses to our survey, all but three trusts 
provided at least one example of a lesson learnt or a 
change in practice introduced following a patient safety 
incident. The lessons or changes were mostly derived from 
incident reports or an analysis of underlying causes of an 
incident. In some trusts, complaints and claims were logged 
on the same system as patient safety incidents which 
enabled them to obtain a more complete picture of errors 
and enhanced their capacity to learn (Figure 16 overleaf). 
3.11 We found trusts do not routinely produce cost  
data on the impact of incidents or evaluations of the 
changes made to processes or the environment. Only 
three trusts had evaluated the costs incurred as a result  
of all incidents. The figures estimated range from  
£88,000 to £400,000 per year. Six trusts calculated the 
cost of specific patient safety incidents (for example, a 
fractured neck of femur due to a hospital-based fall costs 
£10,000 and inadequate patient information or clinical 
details on diagnostic requests costs approximately  
£1 million per year). Fourteen trusts have undertaken 
analysis of savings made by changes to improve patient 
safety, though only three included the investment costs 
(Case examples 6 below and 7 on page 46).
The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust
Situation: Many patients at the Royal Marsden require irradiated 
blood and blood products to prevent Transfusion Associated Graft 
Versus Host Disease, a serious and often fatal disease that occurs 
when there are histocompatibility differences between donated 
cells and the recipients cells, usually associated with bone marrow 
transplant. Transfusion Associated Graft Versus Host Disease has a 
high mortality rate (90-100 per cent). To ensure quality control, the 
National Blood Service irradiates blood products for healthcare 
providers using dedicated equipment. There is a premium charge 
for each bag of blood, platelets or white cells irradiated (currently 
£6.39 per bag). 
Until 2001, the Trust ordered both irradiated and non-irradiated 
blood and blood products and the following checks were in place 
to ensure that patients who required irradiated blood were given it:
n training in safe blood transfusion practice was given to all 
new nurses and doctors coming to the Trust;
n the Blood Transfusion policy was posted on the hospital 
intranet and available to all nurses, doctors and  
clinical staff;
n a quick reference guide for the busy clinician detailing which 
patients must receive irradiated blood products was printed on 
the back of the blood cross match;
n the Royal Marsden Manual of Clinical Nursing procedures 
contained evidence and information on Transfusion Associated 
Graft Versus Host Disease; and
n ‘Radsure’ labels that change colour following irradiation were 
used on blood products.
Despite these checks, in 2001, a patient in the Intensive Therapy 
Unit who had recently had a bone marrow transplant received a 
transfusion with non-irradiated platelets, and died a few weeks later.
Action: An in-depth investigation into this serious incident found 
the causes were multi-factorial. At the National Blood Service, a 
new technician was preparing the platelets and a power-cut  
occurred interrupting the processing, causing non-irradiated blood 
to be sent to the Royal Marsden. At the Royal Marsden, a new 
technician in the laboratory was under considerable time-pressure 
and instead of putting the platelets to one side when they arrived, 
she placed them in the agitator and carried on with another task. 
In the Intensive Therapy Unit the staff nurse was very busy so the 
sister on call for the hospital offered to get the platelets for her. 
Although the sister had had some blood transfusion training and 
would have been familiar of irradiated products, she worked in 
a non-haematology area. Seeing the blood technician was busy, 
the sister verified that the platelets were for the correct patient and 
took them up to the Intensive Therapy Unit. After checking with the 
staff nurse, the patient was given the transfusion. 
The patient in question was expected to have died despite the 
incident, however it was decided during the investigation that as 
so many patients at the Sutton site of the Trust require transfusions, 
risks of further incidents should be reduced by the purchase of 
only irradiated blood products. A business case to justify the extra 
costs involved was put to the Trust Board (with the support of the 
Clinical Governance Executive Committee). Though the reasons 
behind the proposal were to ensure patient safety, the business 
case also put forward an economic argument for the purchasing 
of only irradiated blood products. Transfusion Associated Graft 
Versus Host Disease does not cause immediate death but a slow 
(up to three weeks), painful and therefore costly one as the patient 
will have to be cared for in an Intensive Therapy Unit bed, costing 
around £52,000. Hence, the Trust Board deemed that the extra 
costs of the Sutton site purchasing all irradiated blood was good 
value, as well as an essential patient safety measure, and thus 
approved the proposal.
Outcome: The Trust has been purchasing only irradiated blood 
and blood products for the Sutton site for over three years and 
there have been no further incidents of Transfusion Associated 
Graft Versus Host Disease.
Source: National Audit Office
CASE EXAMPLE 6
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16 Trusts’ examples of lessons learnt as a result of in-depth investigations of patient safety incidents, trend analysis, complaints 
and claims and national recommendations
The top five areas for trusts to focus improvements on were problems with equipment (87 examples); medication errors (65 examples), 
patient falls (48 examples), poor records and lack of documentation (36 examples) and self-harm (34 examples).
NOTE
Two hundred and sixty-four trusts submitted a total of 749 examples of lessons learned.
Source: National Audit Office Survey of Acute, Ambulance and MH Trusts, 2004
Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust
Description of the problem – Staff reported 
falls by patients in outpatient clinics. Trend 
analysis revealed that there was a high level 
of low consequence incidents. 
How the problem was addressed – Staff 
were made aware of how to minimise 
the potential for slips and falls by elderly 
patients. The Board made a one-off 
investment of £15,000 to replace all patient 
stools in waiting areas with chairs with arms 
and back support. 
Outcome of actions taken – The risk of 
recurrence has been significantly reduced. 
There were no patient falls from stools 
within outpatient clinics in the eight months 
after the chairs were introduced. A cost 
benefit analysis of the replacement furniture 
revealed long term savings on the cost of 
claims as the result of patient falls. 
The Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University Hospitals
Issue: The quality of the hospital case notes was having an impact on the 
delivery of care due to poor presentation, content and maintenance of files. 
Identified via: Poor availability of case notes during patient consultation was 
identified through reported incidents and patient complaints and claims. 
Action: The Trust formed a case note committee with representatives from a 
wide range of occupations. A new case-note folder with 4 sections and a 
see-through plastic document slot on the front was introduced:
n front  – tracking reminder and instructions
n section 1  –  orange: all correspondence, including interim discharge 
notes and summaries, with the most recent letter uppermost
n section 2  –  green: referral letter and clinical medical notes 
in chronological order, divided into specialties, 
and pink: consent forms and do not attempt 
resuscitation cards 
n section 3  –  blue: results of all investigations, divided according 
to specialty
n section 4  –  grey: the remaining notes and 
yellow: therapy records.
The outer-cover was designed to have colour coded margins for the benefit of 
staff filing the records. The Medical Records Managers made presentations 
to Trust staff to educate them about the new system. The Trust financed the 
introduction of computer scanning to replace the microfiching of case notes. 
A three month supply was ordered and following the launch of the system the 
committee continued to gather comments from staff so that the system can be 
adjusted as necessary. The hospital is also improving the quality of existing 
records by refurbishing and replacing old case note folders. 
Outcome: Staff feel case notes easier to use as the presentation of 
information has improved and there has been a reduction in the number 
of bulky records. Retrieval has been improved through the use of scanned 
notes. The case note committee will be looking at filing and re-housing case 
notes in the future.




Situation – Lack of robust multi-disciplinary 
training and development in the 
management of obstetric emergencies and 
the interpretation of cardiotocographs. 
How it was identified – The gaps were 
highlighted through the Trust system of formal 
review and root cause analysis for serious 
patient safety incidents. The recommendations 
from the Confidential Enquiries into Maternal 
Deaths and Stillbirths and Deaths in Infancy 
(4th and 7th annual reports) drew attention 
to the need for robust forward planning. 
Additionally the guidance and requirements 
from the Clinical Negligence Scheme for 
Trusts informed the Trust.
Action – In partnership with medical staff 
and midwives, the Trust developed a robust 
twelve month training plan. All staff were 
informed of the plan and this enabled 
training places to be booked in advance to 
ensure operational areas were not depleted 
of essential staff. All information is recorded 
onto the training database, which enables 
managers to flag up when staff are due 
training updates.
Outcome: Training and development skills 
for dealing with obstetric emergencies 
and interpretation of cardiotocographs is 
now part of the culture of the Trust. This 
is reflected in the Trust achieving Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts Maternity 
Standard Level 3 in January 2005. Staff also 
feel that there is greater cohesion in working 
relations within the multi-disciplinary team. 
The Trust will be auditing the training to 
determine the impact it has had on practice 
within the maternity unit. 
Problem: Numerous ligature points on acute wards resulting in a high risk of 
patients attempting to hang themselves. 
How it was identified: A serious patient safety incident occurred and NHS 
Estates issued a directive shortly afterwards. 
Action taken: Ligature points steering group set up which developed an action 
plan and secured annual capital funding to progress work on reducing the 
number of ligature points in the wards.
Outcome of actions taken: Analysis of incidents reported shows that there 
are few occasions when in-patients have been able to use a ligature point. 
When they have tried to harm themselves, the safety solutions planned by the 
steering group have worked, resulting no injury or minor injury to the patient. 
Westcountry Ambulance Services
Description of the problem: An adverse incident involving the incorrect use of 
a First Response Emergency Defibrillator was reported in accordance with the 
Trust’s policy. There was no adverse effect on the outcome for the patient. 
How the problem was found: Following submission of an adverse incident a 
thorough and in depth investigation took place and the findings presented to 
a Serious Untoward Incident Panel. The investigation identified that, although 
the employee had received training in the use of defibrillators, he had not been 
trained in the use of the specific defibrillator in question. The Panel considered 
the Trust’s strategies, systems, processes, procedures, standards and working 
arrangements; the sufficiency of resources; the adequacy of risk assessments and 
control systems; and competency issues. It recommended that the Trust undertake 
significant actions to manage risk of recurrence.
Actions taken: 
1  The supplier of the defibrillator delivered training covering topics such as 
controls and visuals, manual operation and safety notices and maintenance. 
The Trust then assigned a fully trained and competent ‘device expert’ to each 
Assistant Divisional Officer zone. Area Training Officers were also trained.
2  The Trust provided training leads to facilitate instruction for all staff in 
accordance with the formal programme and support to the ‘experts’ to 
ensure that the training was completed. The Director of Operations tasked 
each Assistant Divisional Officer with ensuring compliance. 
3  The Trust introduced a formal process for individual members of staff to raise 
competency issues and identify training needs.
Outcome of actions taken: Competent staff now use the defibrillator which means 
the device is used correctly and safely. The Trust expects that this will lead to 
improved patient outcomes. Learning from the incident has been shared with 
other ambulance trusts via a national forum and to date over 30 staff have used 
the procedure to access additional training, information, instruction regarding 
medical devices. A full evaluation of the system is due to take place next year.
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY
part three
46
Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Trust
Situation: Research shows that people diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder take up an unduly high percentage of 
resources, often because they drop out and re-engage or stay 
with treatment services for years. High rates of self-harm and 
suicidal behaviour can result in frequent ambulance call-outs 
and attendances at accident and emergency and admissions to 
medical and acute psychiatric services.
The Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Trust noticed an increasing 
trend in the number of their service users diagnosed with 
borderline personality disorder. The majority of patients remained 
on the island with support from community and in-patient services, 
as placements in specialist units on the mainland were expensive, 
difficult to secure and required the patient to leave behind his 
or her social network. However, staff felt local services were not 
necessarily well equipped to help this client group.
Action: In order to address clinical and financial concerns the 
Trust explored options for a specialist personality disorder service. 
Preliminary research shows that treatment combining cognitive and 
behavioural strategies with validation and acceptance strategies to 
enhance clients’ commitment to therapy, increase adaptive coping 
and reduce self-harm and suicidal behaviours is effective. 
The Trust therefore developed the Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
service. It used staff from existing social work, mental health and 
occupational therapy services. Therapists attended a commitment 
day to build motivation and they and their managers signed up 
to making time available for training as well as delivering the 
service. The Trust initially invested in training for ten therapists. 
Each therapist works part-time on weekly individual and group 
sessions for between one and three clients for a year and is 
available to be contacted on the telephone. Eighteen months after 
the project began an audit methodology to quantify the outcomes 
of the Dialectical Behaviour Therapy was developed. 
Outcome: Managers prioritised achievements for the service as: 
reduced in-patient bed use, reductions in suicide and self-harm and 
positive effects on the trained therapists’ colleagues. The therapists 
added improved mental health and quality of life for clients.
n In-patient bed use and accident and emergency attendance: 
Psychiatric in-patient bed use decreased by more than half, 
attendance at accident and emergency by 26 per cent and 
the use of the Medical Assessment Unit beds by 94 per cent. 
(see table below)
n Incidents of self-harm and suicidal behaviour: Clients’ 
diary cards showed a decrease in reported self-harm (a full 
sample was not available). The modified Self-Harm Inventory 
scores revealed a similar trend, but one client who dropped 
out of the therapy did commit suicide a year later. Other 
professionals working with this client group also reported 
decreased incidents of self-harm and suicidal behaviour.
n Views on the impact of the service: Colleagues were generally 
positive about the programme and reported that the therapists 
were sharing useful skills. All clients agreed that the service 
was useful and the majority felt that the Dialectical Behaviour 
Therapy had helped them to change negative thought patterns 
or handle relationships better. However, they were concerned 
that there were gaps between treatment sessions and these 
needed to cover weekends. 
n Improvements in mental health and quality of life: Results of 
psychometric assessment and patient surveys showed some 
reductions in clinical symptoms, such as depression, anxiety 
and dependent personality features. However, there was an 
increase on the hostility and borderline personality sub-scales.
Source: National Audit Office
CASE EXAMPLE 7
NOTES
1 does not include ambulance call-outs
2  based on ten clients who received the full therapy package and four service users who participated in the skills group
3  based on bed days and does not include treatments or community resources needed by clients
4  savings must be off-set against the initial cost of £20,000 and £30,000 in the second year. The Trust estimate that on-going costs will be  
£10,000 per year for training
 Accident and Emergency Medical Beds Psychiatric Beds Total Average cost  
     per patient
Year before Dialectical  £3,3181  £38,602 £248,193 £290,113 £20,722 
Behaviour Therapy
Year after Dialectical  £2,4491  £2,270 £117,916 £122,635 £8,760 
Behaviour Therapy
Savings £869  £36,332 £130,277 £167,478
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3.12 Although researchers have quantified the frequency 
of medical errors and patient safety incidents, particularly 
in the United States of America, there has been little 
work on identifying and evaluating solutions and even 
less on cost-effectiveness25. The estimates of the costs 
of patient safety incidents included in An organisation 
with a memory1 alone suggest that most interventions 
and solutions would have a positive cost-benefit ratio. 
However few trusts have used a business case model to 
argue for investment in prevention. Whilst the National 
Patient Safety Agency plans to develop template business 
cases to accompany solutions, by April 2005 only one, on 
infusion pumps, was available to trusts. 
Trusts do learn from complaints but more use 
could be made of this source of information
3.13 We found 91 per cent of trusts had taken steps to 
inform patients about how they might raise their concerns 
about safety, though 20 trusts did so only if the patient 
had already experienced a patient safety incident. All 
trusts had at least one route through which patients could 
raise issues, with four trusts operating an on-line reporting 
system for them. 
3.14 Formal patient complaints can also be an important 
way of ensuring that poor or unsatisfactory outcomes 
of care are recognised and improvements made and 
they can also be the way that adverse events are first 
identified. Between 2001 and 2004, the Commission 
for Health Improvement’s clinical governance reviews9 
identified that many barriers existed to patients making 
complaints, and that it was rare to find formal systems that 
ensured that complaints would be reviewed, acted upon 
and the lessons disseminated across the organisation. 
3.15 From July 2004 responsibility for dealing with 
complaints that could not be resolved satisfactorily at the 
local level passed to the Healthcare Commission. Since this 
responsibility for second stage complaints was transferred 
the numbers made have increased significantly (expected 
around 3,000 per annum, but nearly 7,000 requests to 
review complaints have been received in the first ten months 
to May 2005). As a result the Healthcare Commission 
has focused on handling the complaints and has not had 
the time or resources to promulgate wider lessons. The 
Healthcare Commission is expected to analyse and identify 
common issues and early findings indicate26:
n 60 per cent of referrals in a month are from the 
acute sector, with around four per cent about mental 
health services and one per cent about ambulance 
trusts; and
n complaints are mainly about: poor communication 
with patients and relatives, poor clinical practice, 
unsatisfactory patient experience, poor staff attitude 
and poor complaints handling.
3.16 Sixty-eight per cent of trusts reported that they had 
involved patients in identifying priorities and 58 per cent 
in developing solutions through patient forums, 
representation on trust boards and via complaints and 
claims. This was in contrast to the YouGov poll13 where 
just 30 per cent of senior managers reported that patients 
were actively involved in activities to improve patient 
safety. And in our survey of patients, six per cent said  
they were consulted about how the safety incident  
should be prevented from happening to someone else  
and nine per cent were told what the hospital was going 
to do to prevent a similar incident.
3.17 A third of trusts stated their Patient Advice and 
Liaison Service was the most effective way patients could 
raise their concerns about patient safety issues, while a 
quarter felt that complaint forms were most effective. In 
the trusts we visited the Patient Advice and Liaison Service 
had facilitated open communication about concerns 
between patients and staff and in many cases prevented 
these issues from escalating into a formal complaint or a 
patient safety incident (Case example 8). In most cases the 
Patient Advice and Liaison Service manager made a report 
to the committee responsible for patient safety which was 
followed by a review by the trust board. 
Clinical audit is still under utilised as a 
learning tool 
3.18 Clinical audit is an important component of clinical 
governance which helps to identify deviations from 
standard care practices, including clinical incidents, and 
has many opportunities for learning. The Commission for 
Health Improvement concluded in 2004 that NHS trusts 
were beginning to establish clinical audit strategies based 
on the National Institute of Clinical Excellence guidance 
and National Service Frameworks. In addition, there were 
positive trends in the understanding and development 
of clinical audit in some trusts but multi-disciplinary 
approaches to audit were rare and there was limited 
dissemination of learning9.
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3.19 A number of the Royal Colleges have worked 
with specialties, such as cardiothoracic surgery and 
intensive care, to implement standardised clinical audits 
in all relevant trusts. These provide an evidence base 
for evaluating clinical care and in the last two years the 
Royal Colleges have published the outcome for individual 
trusts; highlighting lessons and raising performance. 
From April 2004, the Healthcare Commission assumed 
responsibility for developing a national programme  
of clinical audit and for evaluating compliance.  
Case example 9, illustrates the approach of one  
ambulance trust in using clinical audit to improve 
outcomes for its patients.
Trust-wide application of lessons and 
embedding of learning is patchy
3.20 To ensure effective organisational learning 
following patient safety incidents it is essential to cascade 
lessons learnt to the relevant staff groups and monitor 
their compliance with this new information. Trusts 
shared the examples of lessons learnt through clinical 
governance reports, internal risk management reports 
and trust-wide and departmental newsletters, but most 
used a combination of methods to disseminate learning, 
increasing the chance that the message gets through 
(Figure 17 overleaf). 
3.21 The National NHS Staff Survey 20046 showed that 
only 29 per cent of respondents felt that the different parts 
of their trust communicated effectively with one another. 
We found there were other barriers to implementing 
lessons learnt, though many trusts had taken action to 
overcome these (Figure 18 overleaf). There were also wide 
variations in the systems for embedding organisational 
learning. Where monitoring of lessons identified a lack 
of implementation, many trusts placed the issue on the 
risk register, facilitated discussion of the issues between 
the management and staff, or gave responsibility for close 
monitoring to a specific committee or group. 
3.22 The National NHS Staff Survey6 also found that  
only 43 per cent of staff felt that their trust built strong 
co-operative links with other organisations. Our results 
also showed that sharing of best practice with external 
organisations was very patchy, with 63 per cent of  
trusts surveyed sharing learning with other local trusts, 
often through organised networks or the Ambulance 
Service Association.
 
Norfolk and Waveney Mental Health Partnership  
NHS Trust
Situation: The Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation target has 
been to reduce the suicide rate by at least one fifth by 2010 
and in 2002 the Trust prioritised the reduction of suicide risks. 
In developing an action plan, the Trust wanted to incorporate 
the views of the relatives of patients who had taken their own 
lives regarding the potential risks within the Trust’s policies and 
procedures. The Trust organised meetings for relatives and two 
representatives from the Trust to talk through some of the issues 
surrounding the risks for service users. A group of relatives were 
then supported to make recommendations to the Trust aimed at 
reducing suicide risks. 
Action: During the two meetings, the relatives proposed 
recommendations involving:
n patients’ access to belts and shoelaces;
n availability of information for relatives/carers;
n training of unqualified staff;
n a named contact for the relatives if a patient dies; and 
n a single point of entry to each ward. 
These recommendations were put to the Trust Board, which 
agreed with them in principle but also stressed that the privacy 
and dignity of patients should be considered at all times. 
Outcome: All these points were actioned. The Trust revised its 
clinical standards on Additional Observation of Patients at Risk, 
including the need for the documentation of the rationale for 
the removal/ or not of potential risks of self-harm and involving 
the patient and carer/relative in the decisions for the care plan. 
Guidance was issued to staff about involving relatives in risk 
assessments. The Communications of Clinical Risk policy was 
agreed which details when the Trust may be obliged to breach 
confidentiality. Unregistered staff now have training regarding 
physical health monitoring, in addition to the same mandatory 
training in basic life support as registered staff. The Trust now 
includes a named contact in its incident file if a patient dies. 
All acute in-patient wards were re-designed to ensure only one 
point of entry and exit and the nurses stations were moved 
next to the entrance for better observation. The Trust have also 
recently introduced a swipe card system for staff and patients in 
one area. This system is planned for the remaining adult acute 
in-patient wards. The Trust has seen a reduction in the number of 
in-patient deaths as a result of suicide. 
CASE EXAMPLE 8
Source: National Audit Office




Staffordshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Situation: Coronary Heart Disease is the single most common 
cause of premature death in the United Kingdom and ambulance 
services deal with a significant number of patients with this 
disease. During cardiac arrest a lack of oxygen causes brain 
injury within four minutes and death will occur within twelve 
if no therapy is given. Therefore optimal survival depends 
primarily on early access to emergency medical services, early 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, early defibrillation and early 
advanced life support. 
In Staffordshire approximately 3,000 people die prematurely 
each year as a result of cardiac arrest and Staffordshire 
Ambulance Service NHS Trust has adopted a number of 
procedures to improve its performance in treating these patients. 
There is clear evidence that appropriate intervention leads to 
increased chances of survival and the Trust uses the Advanced 
Medical Priority Dispatch System, which has a high sensitivity 
for identifying cardiac arrest cases and allows the call-taker to 
give pre-arrival instructions, to maximise the assistance offered 
to the patient before paramedics attend the scene. Although the 
Department’s minimum response time is eight minutes the Trust 
expects the first paramedic to arrive on the scene within  
4 minutes and 59 seconds. The Trust has also purchased  
12 lead Electrocardiograms to allow pre-hospital thrombolysis 
to be administered and Zoll defibrillators which store clinical 
performance data. 
Action: The Clinical Audit Department measure and audit 
each individual case of cardiac arrest and acute myocardial 
infarction attended by the Trust, using paper and electronic 
patient report forms. It matches the dispatch system records with 
the electrocardiogram and defibrillator data, such as cardiac 
waveforms, blood pressures, pulse oxyimetry and an audio 
recording of the event. 
Outcome: Ambulance crews reached 50 per cent of calls within 
4 minutes and 59 seconds. Return of spontaneous circulation has 
increased from 22.99 per cent in 2002-03 to 25.69 per cent 
in 2003-04. The results of the audit and anonymous reporting 
of concerns about poor execution of chest compressions led 
to the Trust purchasing equipment to provide mechanical chest 
compression/heart massage for community paramedics to use 
during cardiopulmonary resuscitation. The Trust is now introducing 
these devices into the ambulance fleet. To ensure that patients 
receive the most effective treatments the Trust hopes to collaborate 
with acute trusts to facilitate the audit of the complete care pathway. 
CASE EXAMPLE 9
Source: National Audit Office
The number of patients receiving pre-hospital thrombolysis in Staffordshire has increased from 137 in 2003-04 to 288 in 2004-05
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3.23 Ninety-one per cent of trusts stated that they shared 
lessons with their strategic health authorities, but the 
trusts we visited felt that they were not receiving sufficient 
feedback. In contrast, although half of strategic health 
authorities used clinical governance networks as an 
opportunity to disseminate learning and good practice, 
they reported that trusts were often reluctant to share 
their lessons. NHS organisations were concerned that as 
foundation trusts are not required to report to strategic 
health authorities that they could miss out on information.
3.24 Since summer 2004, the National Patient Safety 
Agency’s 28 Patient Safety Managers have been working 
with most trusts to help share good practice and develop 
local solutions. Patient Safety Managers are well placed to 
improve the links between trusts and their strategic health 
authority and to share learning locally (Case example 10). 
However, just 19 per cent of trusts had shared lessons 
with the National Patient Safety Agency and there was 
a perception that it was not interested in disseminating 
learning from individual trusts nationally. Three-quarters  
of trusts did say that they were planning to increase  
the extent to which they shared lessons learnt with  
other organisations.
Nationally the focus has been on 
processes and systems rather than 
organisational learning
Safety alerts can be an effective way of 
ensuring solutions are implemented, but 
compliance must be audited
3.25 A number of NHS organisations used safety alerts 
as a key tool for sharing lessons learnt but there was little 
monitoring or information as to whether trusts were acting 
on them. In 2003, the Department piloted a system to 
follow-up on these alerts. After a successful six month 
pilot, the Department introduced an electronic system 
(Safety Alert Broadcast System) in which a nominated 
responsible person from each trust (generally the Medical 
Device Liaison Officer) was required to acknowledge the 
receipt of the alert and record the actions the trust had 
taken, in relation to the deadline for completing action on 
the alert. Strategic health authorities are responsible for 
monitoring the responses. 
All trusts use at least one method to disseminate lessons learnt. 
Method of dissemination 
Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts 2004










to local managers, 
e.g. ward sisters, 
who cascade it  




percentage of trusts using particular method 
How trusts disseminate lessons learnt  17







Source: National Audit Office survey of NHS acute, ambulance and 
mental health trusts 2004
Actions to address barriers
n Improvement of distribution and 
communication system
n Introduction of newsletters
n Intranet
n Prioritising actions
n Risk assessments and risk registers
n Education and training to  
increase awareness
n Fair-blame culture
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Situation: The Strategic Health Authority identified patient safety 
and clinical governance as key priorities and that more work 
needed to be done to ensure trusts across the patch learned from 
each other to improve their service.
Action: It undertook a three month programme of informal visits to 
each NHS organisation to gain an understanding of the various 
approaches to clinical governance and subsequently established 
a Clinical Governance Forum in November 2002. This included 
all acute, ambulance, mental health and primary care trusts and 
has recently been extended to include representatives from the 
Independent Sector. NHS Direct and the National Patient Safety 
Agency’s Patient Safety Manager were also active participants. 
All stakeholders, contributed to the terms of reference. The Forum 
meets quarterly and focuses on:
n organisational culture and structure in relation to  
clinical governance;
n specific clinical governance topics and priorities on  
the trust-Led agenda;
n the sharing of good practice; and
n networking between colleagues across  
organisational boundaries.
A clinical governance network, structured around the Clinical 
Governance Forum, has evolved based upon streams of work 
covering all clinical governance areas and incorporating relevant 
issues raised by other networks (for example the senior nurse 
group). Underpinning this network is the theme that clinical 
governance is everybody’s business and it operates with the 
Clinical Governance Forum at its hub. It encourages active 
stakeholder participation and a series of targeted educational 
events supports its development. The annual Clinical Governance 
Conference is central and it engages up to 300 health 
professionals, support staff, clinical governance leads, delegates 
from staff organisations and patient representatives, through a 
high quality programme delivered by national speakers. 
The network also provides a framework through which the 
National Patient Safety Agency can engage in the local clinical 
governance agenda, meeting the needs of the local health 
economy and national programme priorities. This convergence 
of agendas between the Strategic Health Authority and National 
Patient Safety Agency allows closer working on clinical 
governance issues and helps maximise the potential for the 
spreading of good practice and the dissemination of lessons 
learned from serious untoward incidents. One such example of 
this synergy was the “Mind the Gap” regional workshop held on 
12 July 2004 in which the strategic health authorities and trusts in 
the north of England met to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
organisations in the sharing of learning and good practice.
The National Patient Safety Agency’s Patient Safety Manager has 
also participated in the review of the Strategic Health Authority 
serious untoward incident policy and maintains a regular office 
presence as an important stakeholder in the output of the clinical 
governance team. In addition, the National Patient Safety Agency 
has delivered Root Cause Analysis training across all trusts within 
the Strategic Health Authority, driven the “cleanyourhands” 
campaign aimed at preventing the spread of infection, and has 
been working to develop trust readiness for Clinical Negligence 
Scheme for Trusts assessment.
The Strategic Health Authority has worked with local trusts to 
include local priorities into the framework of clinical governance 
plans, for instance hospital acquired infections and suicide and 
child protection, and broadened its engagement on clinical 
governance issues through the secondment of a risk manager  
from a local acute trust for one day a week over a period of  
18 months. The secondee has developed local “learning lessons” 
bulletins, each based around a particular theme, with input from 
the National Patient Safety Agency’s Patient Safety Manager. The 
Strategic Health Authority is building on it to produce technical 
bulletins and a newsletter incorporating a regular feature from the 
National Patient Safety Agency.
Outcome: Trusts are very positive about the efforts made by the 
Strategic Health Authority to share learning and the involvement 
of the Patient Safety Manager. The annual Clinical Governance 
Conference is highly rated. The Patient Safety Manager is actively 
identifying lessons learnt locally and asking for more information 
about these issues. The Strategic Health Authority has promoted  
a proactive safety culture emphasising that risk management 
should be an integral part of all trusts’ operations through its 
network and bulletins. 
Source: National Audit Office
CASE EXAMPLE 10
Northumberland and Tyne and Wear Strategic Health Authority
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3.26 Between April 2004 and April 2005, trusts received 
93 alerts and acknowledged them in 99.7 per cent of 
cases. The alert issuing organisations do not have the remit 
or funds to investigate how the advice was used and 
during our visits we found examples where trusts had 
signed up to undertake specific actions but when 
resources were not forthcoming, a similar incident 
occurred. The Chief Medical Officer, in his annual report 
for 200410, highlighted the fact that some self-reports of 
compliance with the removal of non-collapsible rails in 
mental health services proved unreliable, and only 
54 per cent of organisations had fully completed the 
actions required to reduce harm from oral methotrexate 
50 days beyond the deadline. Although he questioned 
whether some deadlines were realistic, the Chief Medical 
Officer suggested that the general problem with 
implementing alerts is at least partly due to the current 
safety culture in the NHS, rather than the method of 
dissemination of information about risks to patients and 
how to reduce those risks. For the year 2005-06 the 
Healthcare Commission, in assessing trust performance 
against the Standards for Better Health, will be checking 
on trusts’ self-assessments asserting that they have 
implemented all relevant alerts at a sample of trusts. 
3.27 Not all national organisations that issue healthcare 
alerts currently participate in the Safety Alert Broadcast 
System. The most notable omission is the drug alerts 
from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (it issues these by an alternative system that 
operates all hours). During 2004-05, the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency issued 63 medical 
device safety alerts which required action from trusts and 
some also provided advice on environmental and usage 
factors. The trusts we visited told us that the medical 
device safety alerts they received were very useful to 
maintain patient safety. 
3.28 In total the National Patient Safety Agency has 
issued six patient safety alerts and six other notices since 
it was established (Appendix 6). Although the National 
Patient Safety Agency alerts helped raised the profile of 
the particular issue concerned, trusts told us that they 
rarely provided any new information. There was also a 
perception that the alerts were too acute-trust focused, 
contradicted other guidance, and did not apply across 
trusts and that the National Patient Safety Agency had 
not considered the cost implications for implementing 
them. For example, to comply with an alert advising 
acute trusts to use alcohol gel trusts were required to 
identify significant resources out of their existing budget. 
Trusts told us that they wanted the National Patient Safety 
Agency to develop more innovative lessons and real 
solutions to on-going patient safety issues rather than issue 
safety alerts on subjects of which they were already aware.
There are opportunities to improve learning at 
regional and national level
3.29 The present system for analysing and disseminating 
lessons learnt is dependent upon trusts reporting a 
patient safety incident. If trusts devise and implement 
strategies to design out risks before an incident occurs 
then this learning remains at the local level. In addition, 
improvements after patient safety incidents are dependent 
upon trusts carrying out their planned actions and 
embedding the learning in their own practice.
3.30 At a regional level, strategic health authorities 
are well placed to facilitate learning but we found that 
generally learning came from trusts’ own experiences. 
Following the report of a serious untoward incident, trusts 
are required to record the actions taken and lessons learnt. 
Many strategic health authorities told us that at present 
they lack the resources to fully monitor all these reports or 
disseminate the learning from them. At best they reviewed 
the investigation reports and resultant action plans and ran 
trend analysis on untoward incidents to identify high risk 
areas (Illustrative examples 6). 
3.31 Only eight strategic health authorities gave examples 
of interventions following a serious untoward incident, 
usually where the competence of a health professional 
was in question. We found that strategic health authorities 
did not have integrated systems to learn from serious 
untoward incidents, complaints and litigation cases, 
mainly because different parts of the organisation dealt 
with complaints and litigation. There was also no evidence 
of monitoring of these latter areas for learning points. 
Although most strategic health authorities provided 
feedback to trusts following their monitoring of clinical 
governance development plans, they did not monitor 
trusts’ implementation of recognised good practice and 
the lessons learnt. 
3.32 Trusts we visited told us that they had sent incident 
reports to the National Patient Safety Agency via the 
National Reporting and Learning System but had received 
nothing back. Our survey showed trusts wanted the 
National Patient Safety Agency to provide feedback on 
trends in incident reporting so that they could assess their 
position and track their improvements relative to similar 
organisations. In July 2005, the first report5 of the Patient 
Safety Observatory was published. Whilst this mainly 
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Map to show action taken in strategic health authorities to improve patient safety
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 6
Source: National Audit Office survey of strategic health authorities 2004
Cumbria and Lancashire
The clinical governance team inform all 
executive directors, communication and 
governance leads regarding all serious 
untoward incident reports to ensure the 
executive directors are briefed if they are 
on call, the appropriate cross office links 
are made and SHA action co-ordinated.
North and East Yorkshire and North 
Lincolnshire 
The lead on Patient Safety has met with 
the local Patient Safety Manager and 
one of the joint Chief Executives of the 
National Patient Safety Agency to review 
joint working arrangements. This included 
a detailed update of where all 17 trusts 
within the Strategic Health Authority are 
in relation to the National Patient Safety 
Agency initiatives on potassium chloride, 
standard crash calls, methotrexate, near 
patient alcohol gel and infusion devices. 
Dorset and Somerset
After the Willis review against the Risk 
Pooling Scheme for Trusts and the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts in 2002-03, 
the Strategic Health Authority organised 
a seminar for local trusts. This was an 
opportunity to learn from the expertise of 
the Willis team, to de-mystify the trusts’ 
perceptions of reporting requirements for 
both schemes and to obtain answers to 
queries, facilitating the sharing of good 
practice. Breakout sessions were organised 
as part of the event which enabled trusts to 
work together on how to present themselves 
in assessment. All trusts now have been 
assessed as meeting Level 1 or above. 
Essex
At the bi-monthly Clinical 
Governance and Risk 
Management “members’ 
exchange” incidents 
are discussed and 
good practice or areas 
for improvement are 
identified. Minutes are 
circulated to all trusts to 
facilitate further learning. 
The local National Patient 
Safety Agency’s Patient 
Safety Manager sits on 
all the committees and 
feeds in the national 
perspective. In addition, 
the Risk Management 
Committee of the Strategic 
Health Authority (SHA) 
receives information  
and intelligence from  
the Patient Safety 
Manager and from  
other sources from which 
it distils learning and 
good practice.
North East London
The Strategic Health Authority 
disseminated learning and good 
practice through presentations at 
sector specific groups, Clinical 
Governance networks and a 
quarterly newsletter that includes 
an incident summary and an 
outline of actions.
Thames Valley
In November 2004 the Clinical Governance Manager 
organised a Thames Valley Safety Event which was a 
one day free workshop organised in partnership with the 
National Patient Safety Agency for all staff with responsibility 
for risk management, health and safety or any other member 
of staff in an appropriate role. This was an opportunity to 
raise awareness of safety issues for both staff and patients 
and to share learning from specific incidents. It included an 
update on linking to the National Reporting and Learning 
System and a presentation on the National Patient Safety 
Agency’s Seven steps guidance to support implementation 
across Thames Valley.
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focused on an analysis of the incidents reported to the 
National Reporting and Learning System, it also provided 
illustrative examples of how these reports were being used:
n the National Reporting and Learning System received 
reports of 311 incidents linked to anticoagulant 
medicine, including two deaths. The National Patient 
Safety Agency obtained information from medical 
defence and negligence bodies, where in 600 cases 
between 1990 and 2002, one in five (120) reports 
were of the death of a patient, and solutions are now 
being developed in collaboration with the British 
Society for Haematology;
n 493 reports from 45 trusts with problems with 
patient identification, including one in eight 
incidents involving wristbands. Analysis showed 
a lack of systematic and standardised processes to 
support identification and the National Patient Safety 
Agency expects to promulgate advice in the autumn 
of 2005; and
n a review of reported deaths revealed some cardiac 
arrest incidents were the result of equipment 
problems on the crash call trolley. The National 
Patient Safety Agency is collaborating with the  
Helen Hamlyn Trust to fund the design of a crash 
call trolley that eliminates risks around  
missing equipment. 
There is scope to improve evaluation  
and dissemination of learning by other  
NHS organisations 
3.33 In 2001, the Department proposed3 that there should 
be a single system to share lessons on patient safety that 
would draw on information, research and analysis from 
a variety of sources. However, we found that a number 
of organisations have continued to share lessons through 
their own systems (Illustrative examples 7). These lessons 
were often identified from the organisation’s own data 
sources so there is the potential for duplication and 
contradictory advice. 
3.34 The Healthcare Commission has archived the 
evidence base collected during the Commission for Health 
Improvement’s clinical governance reviews at individual 
trusts. Whilst three national reports9 were published, 
covering a wide number of issues, the Healthcare 
Commission have not interrogated the remaining body of 
evidence to promulgate learning about patient safety and 
related issues. 
The work of the NHS Litigation Authority
In the last two years, the NHS Litigation Authority has begun to 
establish itself as more of a learning organisation. It has built on 
its established network of contacts in trusts to publicise high-risk 
areas and provide risk education activities for clinicians. It has 
produced a variety of risk management publications, including 
the long established NHSLA Review, and held two conferences 
and other training events. Since October 2003, trusts and 
researchers have been able to request analyses of claims data 
from the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts and the Risk 
Pooling Schemes for Trusts to assist in risk management. In 
2004 the NHS Litigation Authority formalised a system for the 
sharing of notable practice identified during its risk management 
assessments under which trusts can request assistance on a 
particular issue and be put in touch with other trusts that have 
devised practical solutions. A study27 of NHS Litigation Authority 
data identified those procedures and specialties at most risk of 
litigation. This information could help trusts in developing their 
risk registers. 
The work of the Medicines and Healthcare products  
Regulatory Agency
The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
draws on information obtained through longstanding national 
reporting systems and other data sources, such as the GP 
Research Database, to minimise the risks from the manufacture 
of medical devices and medicines to patients. One report is 
sufficient to trigger investigation and if the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency receives notification of 
serious incidents or early indications of problems, it is able to 
use its resources to identify corrective action. For example every 
medical device incident reported through its Adverse Incident 
Reporting System is risk assessed to identify areas that require 
investigation. In over 50 per cent of cases investigators found 
the incident was due to a problem with the use of the device 
in the hospital, primarily around poor training, learning and 
management issues.
The Medical Device Liaison Officer in each trust can access 
dedicated pages on the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency’s website and they and other staff such as the 
Pharmacy Leads attend study days and conferences on important 
safety issues. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency also disseminates learning through publications such 
as Current Problems in Pharmacovigilance and One liners and 
has been working with other NHS bodies, such as the National 
Patient Safety Agency, to develop training programmes to assist 
in changing healthcare professionals’ practices.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 7
Source: National Audit Office
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY
part three
55
The strategy for the Patient Safety Research 
Programme has yet to have an impact on 
frontline healthcare delivery
3.35 Building a safer NHS for patients3 identified the key 
role that research can play in understanding the human 
factors that cause unintended harm and in developing 
patient-focused solutions to embed in practice across the 
NHS. Compared to other industries, research on learning 
from errors in healthcare was relatively under-developed. 
In 2001, the Department proposed a programme 
of research, with specific foci for the work, and the 
Programme Director made a commitment to concentrate 
on prescribing errors and patient safety during labour. 
3.36 To date the Patient Safety Research Programme in 
England and Wales has published reports from ten of the 
projects it commissioned, at a cost of around £400,000, 
and there are a further 18 studies in progress (there are  
46 projects in the pipeline with a total value of  
£8.9 million). The reports have provided a background  
on reporting systems and confirmed the approaches 
needed to improve patient safety. Key findings are:
n reporting systems and disciplinary arrangements need 
to be separate and feedback from any reporting 
system is vital to maintain clinicians interest;
n the prevailing legal system does not encourage  
health professionals to be open after an adverse 
patient safety incident and they need to be equipped 
with skills to deal with discussions where errors  
are disclosed;
n clinical inexperience; lack of supervision and training; 
heavy workloads and staff shortages; lack of 
equipment and poor communication are the root 
causes of errors in maternity care;
n firm central direction is needed if patient safety 
systems are to be effectively implemented;
n evaluation of the effectiveness of educational 
interventions or incentives is needed; and
n engineering and psychology could be used together 
to design systems which may be more resistant to 
error when humans use medical technology. 
Building a safer NHS for patients3 made a case for 
research to underpin how best to utilise experts, learn 
lessons and disseminate them. The programme has yet to 
deliver on these. 
Developments in information technology 
should help improve patient safety 
3.37 Preventing errors by the appropriate use of 
information technology is well established. The Institute 
of Medicine in the United States of America advised 
that moving from a paper to an electronic based patient 
record system would be the single step that would most 
improve patient safety28. The National Programme for 
Information Technology in the NHS being delivered by 
the Department’s agency, NHS Connecting for Health, 
has begun to roll out its National Care Record system and 
expects it to have full functionality by 2010. Most trusts 
foresee that this will help them in ensuring that patient 
records are no longer lost and there are better controls 
over prescribing (both issues have led to significant 
numbers of patient safety incidents).
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Connecting for Health and Patient Safety
A compelling case for investment in information technology to 
improve patient safety was made in the Audit Commission report: 
A Spoonful of Sugar, (December 2001):
“Complications arising from medicines treatment are the most 
common cause of adverse events in hospital patients…Most errors 
are caused by the prescriber not having immediate access to 
accurate information about either the medicine (its indications, 
contra-indications, interactions, therapeutic dose, or side effects); 
or the patient (allergies, other medical conditions, or the latest 
laboratory results)... Computerised prescribing linked with 
electronic health records will radically alter the way in which care 
is provided and will deliver significant improvements in the quality 
of patient care.”
The Connecting for Health Business Plan re-iterates the NHS 
National Programme for Information Technology’s commitment to 
patient safety:
“Critically, all the new systems will contribute to ensuring safety 
and quality of care while helping to improve efficiency... Our 
cluster teams coordinate the implementation of many thousands 
of IT installations designed to improve the safety, efficiency and 
quality of patient care.”
Action: The Electronic Transmission of Prescriptions
Research has highlighted both the potentially fatal consequences 
of adverse drug reactions and the avoidable nature of many such 
events. The Electronic Prescription Service will contribute to patient 
safety in two ways:
	n It will provide both prescribers and dispensers with more 
information about what medication a patient is taking. This 
will be achieved by populating the patient’s medication record 
on the NHS Care Records Service with information about 
what has been prescribed and dispensed for the patient. 
This will allow those healthcare professionals with approved 
access and within appropriate care settings to view a patient’s 
medication history, supporting the decision on what further or 
alternative treatment should be provided in the light of what 
the patient has already received.
n By using electronic systems and communication, patients’ 
demographic and medication details will not have to be 
interpreted from hand writing, or re-keyed, reducing labelling 
errors and the times when medication information, such as 
dosage or strength, is missing.
Connecting for Health Service Implementation seeks to ensure that 
the potential of this technology is achieved in the Service:
Its stated aim is to connect with the people who will, in their 
day to day work, use the technology to improve patient safety 
and clinical governance - for example through the electronic 
transmission of prescriptions and the NHS Care Record.
Connecting for Health aims to provide the Department and the 
NHS, with support, based on best practice, to enable all local 
health communities to produce robust service improvement plans 
that include evidence-based projections of the quality, safety and 
productive time benefits to be realised from the deployment of the 
National Programme, by the March 2006 deadline. 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 8
3.38 One of the most robust methods for identifying 
unreported incidents is through retrospective audits of 
patient records. Electronic patient records will enable 
trusts to quickly identify unreported incidents, monitor 
trends and promote learning through clinical audit. 
However clinicians will still have an important role to play 
in improving patient safety. For example, although there 
will be automatic identification of adverse drug reactions, 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency will still need detailed reports of clinicians’ 
suspicions as an early warning and to be able link them to 
reactions which emerge at a later date. 
3.39 Knowledge management is a key element of 
successful healthcare delivery. Our report on clinical 
governance4 highlighted that knowledge management 
was one of the least developed components. In our visits 
to trusts we found ward staff had problems accessing 
guidance and information on good practice. The 
Commission for Health Improvement reviews highlighted 
similar concerns9. Although the Department has already 
established the National Electronic Library for Health, 
it plans to make full use of the new NHS information 
technology system to improve access to learning from 
patient safety incidents and near misses. 
3.40 NHS Connecting for Health is working to optimise 
the management of risk in the health service and in 
partnership with the National Patient Safety Agency, is 
developing a range of interventions to reduce such risks as 
the incorrect identification of a patient or the prescribing 
of the wrong drug or dose (Illustrative example 8).
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APPENDIX 1
References to patient safety in previous National Audit 
Office and Committee of Public Accounts’ reports
Health and Safety in NHS Acute Hospital Trusts in England (HC 82, Session 1996-97)
Key NAO findings: As many as 450,000 accidents take place each year in acute hospitals, three-
quarters of which involved patients, costing some £6 million. Accidents will always happen but many 
are preventable, and hospitals should aim to develop a more proactive approach to managing safety 
issues. Senior trust management should lead on actions taken to ensure safety is of the highest priority.
PAC conclusion and recommendations: Treating preventable accidents diverts money from other 
patients. Many hospitals did not have accident recording systems to provide accurate and timely 
information, and there were wide variations in the number of incidents reported. Trusts were 
encouraged to routinely collect and publish information on incidents to promote accountability. 
Staff should be encouraged to report incidents. 
Response from the Department: Hospitals are dangerous due to the nature of their work but risk 
must be better managed. The Chief Executive of the NHS wrote to all trusts asking them to make 
safety a priority area. The Department supported trusts in developing and sharing good practice in 
safety management.
The Management and Control of Hospital Acquired Infection in Acute NHS Trusts in England 
(HC 230, Session 1999-2000)
Key NAO findings: Nine per cent of patients will acquire an infection during their stay in hospital 
leading to a cost of £1 billion annually. Fifteen per cent of infections are preventable. Chief 
Executives may be unaware of the extent of infection in their hospitals. A lack of basic information 
about rates of infection restricts the prioritisation of resources. 
PAC conclusion and recommendations: The Department has taken actions to address this issue, 
though tangible results were not expected until 2003. Infection rate surveillance should be mandatory 
for all trusts. Appropriate funding will be required to support trusts in reducing rates of infection. 
Response from the Department: The Department accepted that incidents could be reduced, 
leading to cost savings of as much as £150 million annually. Surveillance of infections became 
compulsory from April 2001, with results published from April 2002. The Department made funds 
available for infection control training as well as other additional resources to improve systems for 
preventing and controlling infection. 
Hip Replacements: Getting it Right the First Time (HC 254, Session 1999-2000)
Key NAO findings: Trusts are generally unclear about what to report to the Medical Devices Agency 
(now the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency) and half do not have data on 
infection rates for hip replacements. Infection rates of one to two per cent are acceptable. 
PAC conclusion and recommendations: Tightened controls over the introduction of hip prostheses 
from 1995 have not led to uniform compliance from manufacturers, trusts or clinicians so 
implementation needs close monitoring by the Department and the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence. There is a case for a national register of hip replacements. There is a lack of key 
information on infection rates. 
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Response from the Department: The Medical Devices Agency has taken steps to improve reporting 
arrangements for adverse incidents concerning medical devices. The Department accepted the 
advantages of a registry. Enhanced processes for determining the safety and efficacy of interventions 
were being considered. 
Safety, Quality and Efficacy: Regulating Medicines in the UK (HC 255, Session 2002-03)
Key NAO findings: There were 19,000 adverse drug reactions reported in 2001-02, of which  
three per cent were fatal. There was less than one adverse reaction for every 10,000 medicines 
prescribed. Only a small proportion of adverse reactions are subject to a report, and only a third 
of patients read the information leaflet supplied with prescribed medicines. The Medicines Control 
Agency, (now the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency), does not routinely 
monitor the effectiveness of advice to prescibers and pharmacists. 
PAC conclusion and recommendations: There is a low level of participation by health professionals 
in the Yellow Card reporting scheme. The Medicines Control Agency needs to do more to measure 
the effectiveness of safety alerts and warnings and should make use of prescribing information to 
provide feedback to doctors. The Department should facilitate the transfer of information between 
the Agency and the National Patient Safety Agency.
Response from the Department: The Agency agreed to expand its measurement of the effectiveness 
of safety alerts and warnings. It had taken actions to improve adverse drug reaction reporting rates, 
including introducing a direct system of reporting for patients. It agreed that more effective use 
could be made of information collected, though direct feedback to doctors is not within its remit. 
A Safer Place To Work: Protecting NHS Hospital and Ambulance Staff from Violence 
and Aggression (HC 527, Session 2002-03) and A Safer Place to Work: Improving the 
Management of Health and Safety Risks to Staff in NHS Trusts (HC 623, Session 2002-03)
Key NAO findings: Staff do not report incidents because forms are too complex, there is little 
feedback and they fear no action will be taken. Most incidents stem from systemic issues, and there 
are lessons for the health service from other industries. All trusts offer training to reduce risk, but 
there is little evidence as to its effectiveness. Most trusts record incidents involving patients, staff and 
visitors on integrated reporting systems, though there are significant variations in definitions between 
trusts, and significant under-reporting. The National Patient Safety Agency is undertaking work to see 
where improvements can be made.
PAC conclusion and recommendations: The Department and the Counter Fraud and Security 
Management Service should introduce a reporting system to address problems of under-reporting 
and inconsistency in the definitions of the type and severity of an incident. Healthcare workers need 
to be aware of violence and aggression risks early in their careers, to ensure reporting becomes 
second nature. The Department should take steps to address the inconsistency in identifying and 
reporting incidents, and encourage trusts to adopt systems that give complete information on the 
type and nature of the incident. The Department should remind trusts of the need to manage health 
and safety risks. 
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Response from the Department: The Department will strengthen the reporting system and 
investigate why staff do not report. The Counter Fraud and Security Management Service will take 
steps to prevent incidents from occurring. The Department will work to ensure that appropriate 
health and safety training is available to all staff as part of their induction. Guidance was to be 
issued to remind trusts and staff of mandatory reporting obligations.
Achieving Improvements through Clinical Governance: A Progress Report on 
Implementation by NHS Trusts (HC 1055, Session 2002-03)
Key NAO findings: High quality leadership and committed staff are key to improving performance. 
Clinical audit remains underdeveloped in trusts. There has been progress in changing the 
professional culture towards open and transparent ways of working and in developing risk 
management systems. There has been less progress in involving patients and the public and a failure 
to share learning across and between organisations. 
There was no Committee of Public Accounts hearing on this report.
The Management of Suspensions of Clinical Staff in NHS Hospitals and Ambulance Trusts in 
England (HC 1143, Session 2002-03)
Key NAO findings: In a small number of cases, patient safety incident reporting identified poorly 
performing clinicians. The National Patient Safety Agency has developed an incident decision tool 
to support managers in their actions following a patient safety incident. The Department has a key 
role in encouraging trusts to establish an open and fair culture that will lead to reporting clinical 
incidents and promote learning. 
PAC conclusion and recommendations: Trusts are failing to undertake specified employment checks 
when hiring staff, potentially putting patients at risk. There are also weaknesses in communicating 
potential concerns to future employers where staff were suspended, and many trusts fail to complete 
investigations if suspended clinicians leave.
Response from the Department: The Department reminded trusts that pre-appointment checks  
are mandatory.
Improving Patient Care by Reducing the Risk of Hospital Acquired Infection: A Progress 
Report (HC 876, Session 2003-04)
Key NAO findings: Higher priority has been given to preventing hospital acquired infections at 
the national level. Improvements are constrained by limited progress in developing a national 
mandatory surveillance programme and the pursuit of other key policies and priorities. Staff must 
accept personal responsibility for preventing infections. 
Tackling Cancer: Improving the Patient Journey  
(HC 288, Session 2004-05)
Key NAO findings: Most patients were not told how to make a complaint, and in those cases where 
they did make a complaint, some had trouble in obtaining a satisfactory result. Improvements were 
made from 2000 in communicating with patients about their condition, though some patients 
wished to know more about the side effects of treatment. 
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We have used a number of approaches to gather the 
information in this report. These included a census of NHS 
trusts and strategic health authorities, visits to NHS trusts, 
a survey of the public, consultations with the numerous 
stakeholders including a panel of experts, interviews with 
Department of Health and the National Patient Safety 
Agency staff and analysis of national published data  
and documents.
a) Census of NHS trusts
Key among our methodologies was a census of acute, 
ambulance and mental health trusts and a telephone 
survey of all 28 strategic health authorities. Details of the 
surveys are set out below. Key findings and copies of the 
questionnaires used may be found at http://www.nao.org.uk.
1 Acute, ambulance and mental health trusts
Taylor Nelson Sofres undertook a census of 171 acute 
trusts, 30 ambulance trusts, 66 mental health trusts and 
one trust providing all three services on our behalf. All 
three types of trust received the same questionnaire. 
Only one acute trust did not respond our survey, the 
Buckinghamshire Hospitals NHS Trust. We aimed to 
obtain evidence on the progress trusts had made in 
implementing recording systems that provide reliable 
and timely information on patient safety incidents and 
to gather information about existing systems, progress, 
innovation and successes in organisational learning 
for patient safety. The questionnaire was divided into 
sections focusing on the management of patient safety, 
patient safety incident reporting, analysis of incidents and 
organisational learning from incidents and other sources. 
There was also a section for the chief executive of each 
trust to provide their views on patient safety in their trust. 
An organisation with a memory1 highlighted the need 
for trusts to have a culture that encourages staff to report 
incidents and robust systems for incident reporting and 
learning from patient safety incidents. We used these 
criteria to develop an objective way of assessing trusts’ 
performance in regards to reporting and learning from 
patient safety incidents. Scores were allocated on the basis 
of trust responses to a selection of questions regarded 
as key performance indicators (listed in Figure 19). The 
scores presented in Figure 20 are a relative indicator of 
performance and are not an attempt to assign an absolute 
score to trusts. The full model can be found on our website.
Summer 2005 – Re-survey of trusts to update key 
pieces of information
In August 2005, we sent out an update survey to obtain 
data on the number of patient safety incidents and near 
misses reported to trusts by staff during 2004-05 and to 
gauge the amount of progress made in a rapidly changing 
arena. We found trust performance had generally 
improved, for example: more trusts reported having an 
open and fair culture; more trusts had introduced open 
reporting systems; fewer numbers of incidents were going 
un-reported; and classification of incidents had improved. 
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19 Questions from our survey and the scoring system used to assess trusts’ progress towards establishing a reporting 
and learning culture
Source: National Audit Office survey of Acute, Ambulance and Mental Health Trusts, 2004
Question
n A2: Who has lead board level executive responsibility for patient safety?
n A10: How would your organisation describe its safety culture?
n B1: How long has your organisation been operating a trust-wide patient safety incident  
reporting system?
n B9: What steps does the trust take to inform patients of the ways in which they can raise their 
concerns about patient safety?
n B10a: To what extent does your organisation perceive under-reporting of actual patient safety 
incident (those that have an impact on patients) to be a problem?
n B10b: To what extent does your organisation perceive under-reporting of near misses to be 
a problem?
n B16: How does your organisation ensure existing staff are continually made aware of the trust’s 
patient safety reporting requirements?
n	 B17: How does your organisation ensure temporary staff (such as locums and agency nurses) 
are continually made aware of the trust's patient safety reporting requirements?
n B18: How does your organisation ensure contractors are continually made aware of the trust's 
patient safety reporting requirements?
n C17a: When staff report patients safety incidents or near misses, is it the trust’s practice to 
provide the following feedback?
n	 C17b: When patients or the public report patient safety incidents or near misses, is it the trust’s 
practice to provide the following feedback?
n D2: Do all relevant staff groups play a role in the identification of patient safety priorities for 
action within the trust?
n D3: Do patients and the public play any role in the identification of patient safety priorities for 
action within the trust?
n D4: Do all relevant staff groups play a role in the design and development of patient safety 
solutions within the trust?
n D5: Do patients and the public play a role in the design and development of patient safety 
solutions within the trust?
n D6: How does your organisation disseminate lessons learnt across the trust?
n D7: Does your organisation share lessons learnt with external organisations? 
n E1: What actions has the chief executive taken to improve patient safety?
n E4: To what extent does the system your trust currently has in place enable it to meet the Patient 
Safety Domain in the new Standards for Better Health?
Maximum
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2 Strategic health authorities
We conducted semi-structured interviews by telephone 
with the individual responsible for patient safety in each 
strategic health authority. All but one (Shropshire and 
Staffordshire) of the strategic health authorities responded. 
We asked about how they monitor trusts’ performance 
regarding patient safety, what information they gather 
from trusts and the feedback they provide, what training 
they organise and how their work fits in with that of the 
National Patient Safety Agency. 
b) Visits to trusts
We carried out a series of visits to selected NHS trusts 
throughout February and March 2005. We selected 
trusts to visit based on responses they provided in their 
survey return. Key questions we looked at included 
D13 (trusts that felt they had extremely effective systems 
for learning from patient safety incidents) and E4, 
(trusts that considered themselves to have a system to 
learn from patient safety incidents which would meet 
the requirements of the Standards for Better Health). 
Alongside these questions we identified some trusts where 
a unique or innovative approach to the management of 
patient safety was in practice. 
There is wide variation in trusts’ performance but the majority have made substantial progress in introducing a patient safety 
focused environment. 
Percentage score
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During our visits we conducted semi-structured interviews 
with a range of staff involved in managing and learning 
from patient safety incidents, for example senior 
managers, clinical staff and patient representatives. The 
visits also provided us with a more detailed understanding 
how NHS organisations treat patient safety issues and the 
systems they use to learn from patient safety incidents. We 
are grateful to the staff of the organisations we visited for 
their time and assistance. The trusts we visited were:
n Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
n Isle of Wight Healthcare NHS Trust 
n Norfolk and Waveney Mental Health Partnership 
NHS Trust
n North East Ambulance Service NHS Trust 
n Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
n Staffordshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust 
n The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust
n The Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust
c) Case examples
In the course of our visits to trusts we sought to identify 
examples of good practice from which other trusts and 
organisations may be able to learn lessons and improve 
their own performance. We have included a number of 
case examples in the report. These are used as a means 
of identifying and recognising the diverse and often 
innovative techniques trusts have implemented in their 
efforts to improve their record in patient safety and to 
improve their ability to learn from patient safety incidents. 
d) Public survey
We commissioned from Ipsos UK a survey of patients who 
had recently undergone hospital treatment, to learn: 
n whether the risks of treatment had been explained  
to them; 
n whether they had been involved in a patient  
safety incident; 
n whether the hospital informed them if they had been 
involved in such an incident; and
n if they were satisfied with any actions taken by the 
hospital as the result of the incident. 
A sample of 2061 adults were interviewed, of which  
881 had been a patient in an NHS hospital in the previous 
two years. Respondents were aged 15 and over, and the 
results were weighted across sex, age, social grade and 
working status to achieve a nationally representative 
sample. Interviews took place between 29 October and 
4th November 2004. Key findings and a copy of the 
questionnaire used can be found at http://www.nao.org.uk.
e) Research papers
1 International Comparisons
Stuart Emslie, an Independent Healthcare Consultant, 
facilitated two one-week study tours to visit key 
individuals and organisations in Australia and the United 
States of America and a visit to Hong Kong to understand 
how hospitals manage and control patient safety. We 
then commissioned Mr Emslie to produce a report on a 
selection of notable patient safety programmes, initiatives 
and practices in place outside the United Kingdom. A 
summary of these findings is at Appendix 4.
2 Analysis of patient safety databases and  
learning systems
We commissioned ECRI Europe to compare the data 
fields used in England on patient safety incidents with 
information other established systems elsewhere collect 
and examine the operation of incident reporting in some 
trusts in England (Appendix 5).
f) Wider consultations
We consulted with the Royal Colleges (receiving replies 
from the Anaesthetists, Nursing, Pathologists, Psychiatrists, 
Radiologists and Surgeons), the regulatory bodies (General 
Medical Council and the Nursing and Midwifery Council), 
the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, 
the Society of Radiographers, the Ambulance Service 
Association and Doctors.net.uk.
Expert advisory panel
We invited a panel of individuals with a range 
of experience and expertise in patient safety and 
organisational learning to advise on the scope of our study, 
methodologies and emerging findings. There were two 
formal meetings of the panel (March and September 2004) 
and we approached the panel members throughout the 
study period for advice. We are grateful to the following 
panel members for the time and assistance they provided: 
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Professor Peter Hutton Then Chairman Academy of Medical Royal Colleges 
 Council Member General Medical Council
Jeff McIlwain  Consultant, Clinical Risk Management St. Helens and Knowsley NHS Trust
Bob Nicholls  Council Member General Medical Council  
 Former Chairman  National Clinical Assessment Authority
Jan Norman  Project Manager Commission for Health Improvement 
 Director of Governance Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust
Professor James Reason  Professor of Psychology University of Manchester
Representative  (Various) Nursing and Midwifery Council
Ken Smart  Chief Inspector of Air Accidents Air Accidents Investigation Branch
Chris Taylor Principal Inspector, Health Services Unit Health and Safety Executive
Steve Walker  Chief Executive NHS Litigation Authority
Peter Walsh  Chief Executive Officer Action Against Medical Accidents
Dr Alexander Yule  Registrant Member – Radiography Health Professions Council 
 Clinical Governance Manager Cardiff and Vale NHS Trust
David Knight  Project Lead, Patient Safety Department of Health
Dianne Parker Patient Safety Strategy Developer Department of Health
Sue Osborn  Joint Chief Executives National Patient Safety Agency 
Sue Williams      
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Most research on patient safety has recognised that lessons 
from other industries can be instructive. 
The Aviation Industry
Airlines have made considerable improvements to their 
safety records by developing an open and fair culture, 
introducing a high degree of standardisation and 
employing a constant process of reviewing the implications 
of incidents and the outcomes of changes in procedure 
(Figure 21). To develop an open and fair culture where 
individuals report incidents when required, airlines train 
their staff to give them the confidence to speak up. While 
standardisation curtails the autonomy of the individual it 
does not reduce their authority to take action to break the 
chain of events where necessary. Staff view the system as 
more transparent and this has reduced the threshold for 
reporting untoward incidents. As a result airlines have been 
able to move away from confidential reporting to a system 
of open reporting of potential incidents.
While commercial firms are ultimately accountable to 
customers through the market for their services, there 
are regulatory bodies that oversee their systems, audit 
trails and training. The Civil Aviation Authority is the 
independent organisation with the remit to promote 
aviation safety and consequently the safety of passengers, 
staff and the public. Whilst safety is at the heart of 
everything, the means by which aircraft, crew and 
passengers are protected in terms of safety and health  
is multi-faceted. 
The Rail Industry
Staff working in the railway industry in the United Kingdom 
can use the independent Confidential Incident Reporting 
and Analysis System as an alternative way to report safety 
concerns that they feel unable to report through their 
employers’ safety channels. An independent organisation, 
which is external to the rail industry and regulators, manages 
and administers the Confidential Incident Reporting and 
Analysis System. The System is complementary to company 
reporting systems and is not designed to replace these.  
As volume increases the severity of outcome has decreased 
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It captures information that otherwise may not be identified. 
Since becoming compulsory for all United Kingdom rail 
companies in 2000, it has received over 3,000 reports. 
Individuals can submit reports in writing or by phone 
but must provide their name and details. Confidential 
Incident Reporting and Analysis System staff conduct a 
short interview with the individual to ensure they have 
understood the issue and to check that it can be sent to 
the company without identifying those involved. The 
appropriate company will then receive a report for its 
response. The contact details of the individual are destroyed 
and only a number identifies the report. Commonly 
reported issues include signalling problems, near misses 
and fatigue related errors (Illustrative example 9).
Reports and responses are entered into a national database 
where they can be analysed for trends. This information 
can be used alongside other safety performance data to 
identify any trends in safety and help companies to target 
resources to address problems. A suite of summary reports 
are produced – the number of concerns reported, the 
type of issue raised and why it was reported. In addition, 
the Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System 
staff can carry out data searches on behalf of companies, 
for example the number of reports made by employees 
compared with other companies in the sector or more 
detailed analysis of specific issues reported.
The Recreational Diving Industry
The British Sub-Aqua Club represents the recreational diving 
industry and membership for divers is voluntary. Its National 
Diving Committee Incidents Advisor gathers, collates and 
reports on diving incidents and liaises with the Coastguard, 
Royal National Lifeboat Institution and British Hyperbaric 
Association, advising on emerging trends in diving safety, 
making recommendations on future changes. The National 
Diving Committee then issue advice or alerts as required. 
Hundreds of incidents are reported and entered on the 
British Sub-Aqua Club database each year; in 2003, 
409 incidents were reported, and 392 of these were 
investigated (Figure 22). Information for the database 
is drawn from incident report forms that have been 
submitted, as well as the Coastguard, the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution and news reports. 
The British Sub-Aqua Club does not investigate incidents 
at a national level. If a branch is involved an incident 
it will often conduct its own investigation and report 
the findings to the national body. In the event of a 
fatality there is usually a coroner’s inquest and report. 
Occasionally regional representatives are asked to 
investigate if a serious event has occurred and it is felt  
that follow up is required. The British Sub-Aqua Club  
does not have the resources to investigate all the 400 to 
500 incidents that are reported to it each year. 
Most incidents are a result of human error and the 
organisation is careful to protect individuals’ identities 
and to avoid pointing a finger, as this would likely cause 
the flow of information to dry up. It believes blame would 
be inappropriate in a situation where people have had the 
courage and candour to admit to a mistake, thereby giving 
others the opportunity to learn from it. 
Report made to the Confidential Incident Reporting and 
Analysis System
A driver was concerned that the warning boards and 
associated Advanced Warning System magnets were 
incorrectly placed at a level crossing. Despite having raised this 
concern with his manager nothing had been done to rectify  
the situation.
Company response: After the Confidential Incident Reporting 
and Analysis System report was received the company 
acknowledged that there were a number of irregularities with 
the positioning of Advanced Warning System magnets and 
signs on the line. A full survey of the entire line, including all 
crossings, was commissioned. Once complete the company 
undertook to develop a ‘scheme plan’ to specify the work 
required to remove the anomalies and bring the crossing up to 
the current required standard.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 9
22 Incidents reported to the British Sub-Aqua Club
Source: British Sub-Aqua Club
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Incidents Reported 385 351 315 397 452 397 439 465 453 409
Incidents Analysed 385 351 315 370 431 382 417 458 432 392
Most incidents reported to the organisation are investigated. 
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As in England, the patient safety movement has galvanised 
itself in recent years in many developed countries, and 
globally through the World Health Organisation. The 
rate of development of patient safety programmes and 
initiatives is increasing to the point that patient safety 
appears to be the most important common issue in 
health care internationally. For example, an internet 
search for “patient safety” in February 2004 revealed just 
over 500,000 results, the same search in March 2005 
revealed 2,680,000 results – a five fold increase. Whilst 
many less tangible quality issues can be open to debate, 
improving patient safety through reducing the incidence 
of potentially preventable harm appears to have become 
difficult to argue against. 
The following are the five elements of patient safety that 
most developed countries have identified in their strategies 
for improving patient safety:
n A ‘just’ or ‘fair’ culture that encourages a reporting 
and questioning culture;
n Systems for reporting and analysing incidents both 
locally and nationally;
n A good in-depth analysis process to establish 
root causes for selected individual incidents and 
aggregate incident reviews, thus enabling learning;
n A process to ensure that actions are implemented 
and corresponding improvements in patient safety 
and quality of care can be demonstrated; and
n Effective processes for sharing information at various 
levels – nationally, organisationally and clinically 
– for learning and improvement.
In order to improve understanding of the extent and impact 
of patient safety incidents a number of research projects 
have been carried out in various countries. As a result 
patterns and trends are starting to emerge. Indeed, Neale et 
al collated information on international studies involving 
retrospective reviews of patient records to determine the 
incidence of patient safety incidents (Figure 23). This found 
that the average incidence was 8.9 per cent and the average 
incidence of potentially avoidable adverse events was 
3.4 per cent. The variation in data can in part be explained 
by differences in the underlying methodologies for screening 
records to determine patient safety incidents. 
      
23 Results of retrospective case record reviews







































































International comparisons of organisational learning  
for patient safety
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Figures 24 and 25 overleaf presents summary information 
on aspects of patient safety programmes and initiatives in 
selected countries. Given that tremendous differences in 
health care provision can exist within individual countries,  
this information needs to be interpreted with caution.  
Case examples 11 and 12 provide details of some of the 
more advanced reporting and learning systems used in 
Australia and the United States of America. A full report on 
the international comparisons work that we commissioned, 
which details the developments in a number of comparative 
countries, can be found at http://www.nao.org.uk.
 
The Advanced Incident Monitoring System,  
New South Wales, Australia – www.health.nsw.gov.au
The Australian Patient Safety Foundation was initially 
formed by a group of anaesthetists, who continue to provide 
anonymous information to a centralised database, and has 
been researching patient safety since 1988. It developed a 
computerised incident management system with its commercial 
company, Patient Safety International. The Advanced Incident 
Management System provides a mechanism for any adverse 
event or near miss in health care to be reported, coded and 
analysed to identify the underlying causes and to help prevent 
the error from recurring. The system was released to the acute 
hospital sector in Australia in 1998 and since that time it has 
been enhanced significantly. It now allows for the capture of 
any type of incident and has been taken up by over 54 per cent 
of Australian public health organisations. The latest installation 
is in New South Wales, a state of around 7 million people, 
where over 100,000 healthcare users access the system to 
report incidents. The system went ‘live’ in December 2004 and 
has since captured over 30,000 incidents. This information is 
immediately available for follow-up, classification and analysis 
by health managers at the local level through to state level. 
New South Wales conducted an extensive pilot to ascertain 
the different types of service delivery models and how the 
software managed the differences, the incident management 
processes and the training requirements. The New South Wales 
Health Department had previously introduced a version of the 
Department of Veterans' Affairs (United States of America) Root 
Cause Analysis methodology across its entire health care system 
and released its first report on learning from patient safety 
incidents in January 2005. 
CASE EXAMPLE 11
Prepared by Stuart Emslie, Independent Healthcare Consultant under 
contract to the National Audit Office
 
Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority,  
United States of America – www.psa.state.pa.us
The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority is an independent 
state agency established under Act 13 of 2002, the Medical 
Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act. It is charged 
with taking steps to reduce and eliminate medical errors 
by identifying problems and recommending solutions that 
promote patient safety. Under Act 13, all Pennsylvania-licensed 
hospitals, birthing centers and ambulatory surgical facilities are 
required to report what the Act defines as “serious events” and 
“incidents” to the Pennysylvania Patient Safety Authority. In turn, 
the Authority analyses the collected data to identify trends or 
systems failures that can be corrected to prevent future serious 
events and incidents. 
In July 2003, the Emergency Care Research Institute and 
partners, EDS (an international information technology firm) 
and the Institute of Safe Medication Practices, were appointed 
to implement a state-wide web-based patient safety reporting 
system. By mid-November 2003, 22 facilities, representing 
a cross-section of Pennsylvania’s healthcare institutions, were 
voluntarily participating in a test phase of the reporting 
system prior to state-wide roll out. From March 2004, the 
Emergency Care Research Institute produced a comprehensive 
quarterly newsletter containing wide-ranging feedback from 
the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority. State-wide roll out of 
the reporting system, involving over 400 healthcare facilities, 
commenced from June 2004. 
CASE EXAMPLE 12
Prepared by Stuart Emslie, Independent Healthcare Consultant under 
contract to the National Audit Office
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24 Summary of international patient safety programmes and initiatives
Prepared by Stuart Emslie, Independent Healthcare Consultant under contract to the National Audit Office
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1 For comparative purposes we have included a summary of the findings from our own analysis.
2 Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Healthcare oversees national patient safety issues.
3 The Advanced Incident Management System operated by Australian Patient Safety Foundation.
4 Canadian Patient Safety Institute will be covering these issues in implementing its strategic business plan, 2004-2007.
5 To the accreditation body, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations.
6 Most states have established, or are establishing patient safety bodies, e.g. Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority.
7 Not all strategic health authorities or trusts use the Strategic Executive Information System.
8 The first report of the Patient Safety Observatory was published in July 2005.
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25 Summary of the approach adopted in the Devolved Nations
Source: National Audit Office
Scotland
Consultation paper Learning from 
experience: How to improve safety 
for patients in Scotland 2003
a  review of current local and 
national reporting systems 
b developing an open culture 
 
c implementing the Austrialian/ 
 New Zealand Risk Management  




The Scottish Executive Health 
Department has delegated this 
role to NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland, a special health board 
1  Scottish Healthcare Supplies 
issues safety action and hazard 
notices on non-clinical issues 
and has an electronic reporting 
system for devices and estates 
incidents and near misses.
2  NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland has responsibility  
for investigating serious  
service failures.
3  NHS Quality Improvement 
Scotland is currently developing 
a national approach for incident 
reporting across NHS Scotland.
Wales
Improving Health in Wales  
(the NHS Plan) 2001 
a developing an open culture 
 
b sharing of learning from patient 
safety incidents  
c monitoring compliance with 
National Patient Safety Agency 
alerts/guidance
d development of revised S41 
agreement with National Patient 
Safety Agency following the 
Arm's Length Bodies review
1 Welsh Assembly Government 
through its Quality, Standards 
and Safety Improvement 
Directorate
2 All-Wales Advisory Group to the 
National Patient Safety Agency
1 Serious patient safety incidents 
are reported to Welsh Assembly 
Government through its Regional 
Offices. Anonymised incidents 
are logged centrally and 
reviewed by its Clinical Risk 
Committee to determine those 
which require independent 
review and to determine any 
shared learning across Wales.
2 All NHS Wales organisations 
connected and expected to 
report to National Patient Safety 
Agency’s National Reporting 
and Learning system.
Northern Ireland
Consultation paper Best Practice 
– Best Care 2001 
a  evaluation of current systems  
to identify and manage  
adverse incidents
b  open reporting and  
balanced analysis of patient 
safety incidents 
c  development of a Service Level 
Agreement with National Patient 
Safety Agency
d  standardisation of adverse 
incident reporting 
 
Safety in Health and Social Care 
Steering Group, chaired by the 
Deputy Chief Medical Officer
 
 
1  Northern Ireland Adverse 
Incident Centre, part of Health 
Estates, records and investigates 
adverse incidents concerning 
medical devices and equipment 
and issues warnings and 
guidance to prevent recurrence.
2  Serious adverse incidents that 
warant regional action to 
improve safety or care; are of 
public concern; or require an 
independent review are reported 
to the Department of Health, 
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We commissioned ECRI Europe to review and report 
on the implementation of the National Reporting and 
Learning System. The review focused on four trusts’ 
experiences in introducing the new system and how well 
it could be integrated with their existing risk management 
systems. The key findings were as follows:
n the National Reporting and Learning System is an 
extremely sophisticated data collection tool; 
n mapping of local datasets with the national system 
was considered to be complicated; 
n the bespoke systems in use in other countries record 
particular types of incident information collectively 
and have a natural hierarchy. The structure and 
approach of the National Reporting and Learning 
System appears entirely different with similar 
pieces of information (categories) being scattered 
throughout making the mapping even more  
time consuming; 
n two software packages that were procured to 
produce statistical information and enable free 
text searching have not yet delivered feedback 
for trusts; feedback which had been received was 
mostly limited to comments on data quality during 
submission to the national system; and
n trusts that were visited felt that the local systems 
were more important for learning lessons.
The experience of one of the acute trusts reviewed is 
described in Illustrative example 10 and Figure 26  
provides details of some of the explanations about the 
problems of integrating with the National Reporting and 
Learning System given to us by trusts via our survey.
Integrating a trust’s risk management system with the 
National Reporting and Learning System
The Royal United Hospital Bath NHS Trust have used the Prism 
Risk Management System to record patient safety incidents 
for four years. In November 2003 the National Patient Safety 
Agency launched its second trial to collect local reports of 
patient safety incidents and Prism Risk Management Limited 
asked the Trust to be the pilot site for the establishment of the 
electronic link between its ‘Incident Manager’ and the National 
Reporting and Learning System.
Prism Risk Management Limited wrote a piece of software 
which allowed data interface between the two systems. 
Then staff from the Royal United had to map the details and 
categories of information recorded on their adverse incident 
and medication adverse incident forms to the dataset defined 
by the National Patient Safety Agency. Staff reported that they 
found it extremely difficult to match the descriptions to those of 
the National Reporting and Learning System. It took between 
50 to 60 hours and it was hard for Risk Management staff to 
devote time to concentrate on the mapping exercise whilst they 
had to carry out their normal duties. Also without the staff’s 
detailed knowledge and experience of the ‘Incident Manager’ 
database the process may well have taken longer.
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 10
Source: ECRI report to National Audit Office
APPENDIX 5
Integrating trusts’ reporting systems with the National 
Reporting and Learning System 
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“On several occasions the administrators of the National Reporting and Learning 
System challenged the categorisation  
reports we submitted. After we had 
explained the definition they had to agree 
that we had in fact mapped the incident to 
the correct place.
”
“There has been an underestimation of the time and energy required on the part 
of the trust to gear up for compliance.
”
“The number of categories and detail required means that the current simple 
form used for incident reporting, which 
the Trust feels encourages a high level of 
reporting, needs to be changed.
”
“There are many categories which had to be marked as ‘other’ because the 
National Reporting and Learning system 
could not accommodate the incident type 
we had defined.
”
“The two years it took the National Patient Safety Agency to organise the 
whole process and the limited information 
it shared on the process of the programme 
until a very late stage, held our Trust back 
in developing our reporting system because 
we were uncertain of the minimum data sets 
that would be applied.
”
“Our previous electronic system used for reporting patient safety incidents was not 
compatible with the National Reporting 
and Learning System. So we could not 
report automatically and were required to 
complete e--Forms that proved to be very 
time-consuming.
”
“We required investment for a system and so had to produce a 
business case.
”
“Our own Access data base did  not comply.
”
“There were delays in obtaining an upgrade of our risk system.
”
“The National Patient Safety Agency’s mapping toolkit is too acute-focused  
and has caused difficulties with 
appropriate mapping.
”
“We had problems linking the community hospitals - the National 
Reporting and Learning system seems  
to reject data from outside the main 
hospital environment.
”
26 Quotes given by trusts in response to our survey question “How readily has the trust integrated the National Patient 
Safety Agency’s reporting system into its own reporting system?”
“We had problems with mapping the data but got support and assistance from 
the patient safety manager for Greater 
Manchester to solve this.
”
“Contact with the National Patient Safety Agency helped to clarify things.
”
“We had discussions with the local National Patient Safety Agency's patient 
safety manager to agree compromises 
on data mapping.
”
“Staff attended the National Patient Safety Agency's process mapping event 
in Leeds on 17 August 2004  to learn 
how to integrate coding systems.
”
Source: National Audit Office survey of acute, ambulance and mental health trusts, 2004
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Alerts
July 2002 Potassium Chloride Alert – Research identified a risk to patients from errors occurring during 
intravenous administration of potassium solutions. Actions required: policies for the storage and 
handling of potassium chloride concentrate and other strong potassium solutions; the preparation of 
dilute solutions containing potassium, the prescription of solutions containing potassium and checking 
the use of strong potassium solutions in clinical areas.
February 2004 Crash Call Alert – NHS hospitals in England use 27 different crash call numbers. Actions required: 
trusts should review standardising the crash call number to 2222 to reduce the risk that temporary staff 
are unaware of the crash call number, causing a delay in treating the patient. 
July 2004 Oral Methotrexate Alert – 137 patient safety incidents over the last ten years in England alone were 
due to problems with taking this medication. Actions required: provide patient information before and 
during treatment, update prescribing and dispensing software programmes and review purchasing.
September 2004 Hospital Infections Alert – Issued in preparation for the ‘cleanyourhands’ campaign. Actions required: 
install alcohol-based hand rub at point of care across the NHS organisation by April 2005 and assess 
and manage risks associated with its use and storage.
March 2005 Reducing the harm caused by the misplacement of nasogastric feeding tubes – At least 11 patients 
have died as a result of misplaced nasogastric feeding tubes between December 2002-04. A further  
13 incidents where patients were harmed were reported to the National Reporting and Learning 
System. Actions required: provide staff, carers and patients in the community with information on 
correct and incorrect testing methods, carry out individual risk assessment prior to nasogastric tube 
feeding and report misplacement incidents via local risk management reporting systems.
March 2005 Correct site surgery – The pilot of the national reporting system for learning recorded 44 incidents 
related to wrong site surgery. Actions required: use a robust system for marking the correct site for 
surgery; use a verification checklist; review integrated care plans and provide information to staff. 
Notices
May 2004 Improving Infusion Device Safety – At least 700 unsafe incidents are reported each year related 
to infusions, of which 19 per cent are attributed to user error. Actions recommended: review how 
purchasing decisions are made; evaluate the necessity for an infusion device prior to purchase; reduce 
the range of infusion device types in use and have agreed default configurations; and investigate the 
benefits of a centralised equipment library. Include a toolkit to help trusts review their existing device 
management systems and assess the potential for significant cost-benefits and improved patient safety.
April 2005 Ensuring safer practice with Repevax and Revaxis vaccines – Reported incidents where staff have 
given children the wrong vaccine. Actions recommended: develop procedures to check for correct 
vaccine; display pictures of packaging to reduce chances of wrong vaccine being selected and review 
risk assessment procedures for new vaccines.
APPENDIX 6
Outputs from the National Patient Safety Agency 
appendix six
A SAFER PLACE FOR PATIENTS: LEARNING TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY74
Information
September 2004 Spinal Cords Injury Information – Some people with an established spinal cord lesion are dependent 
on manual removal of faeces and without it they risk developing autonomic dysreflexia. Actions 
recommended: developing a policy for manual bowel evacuation based on guidelines such as the 
Royal College of Nursing’s Digital Rectal Examination and Manual Removal of Faeces: Guidance for 
Nurses (April 2004); ensuring nursing staff are aware of the risks associated with these patients, the 
potential harmful outcomes of developing autonomic dysreflexia and how to access staff able to 
undertake a manual evacuation; ensuring experienced staff are available at all times to undertake and 
teach the procedure; and recognising that these patients are experts in managing their bowel care. 
November 2004 Update on producing patient information on methotrexate usage 
November 2004 Update on the implementation of recommended safety controls for potassium chloride in the NHS
April 2005 Improving emergency care for patients who breathe through their neck – Patients who have had 
a laryngectomy or have a long-term tracheotomy may be at risk when receiving emergency care if 
staff are not aware of how to manage their ventilation needs. Actions recommended: ambulance and 
acute trusts include airways management for patients with stomas in relevant local training courses 
for all staff; ensure that all emergency response vehicles and resuscitation trolleys include appropriate 
equipment to administer oxygen effectively and manage the airway of a neck breather and make 
appropriate training equipment available for trainers.
Newsletters
August 2003  Newsline – First quarterly newsletter for the NHS to keep abreast of developments at the National 
Patient Safety Agency
Guidance/Learning
2003  Root cause analysis toolkit – Root cause analysis, is a retrospective review of a patient safety incident 
undertaken in order to identify what, how, and why it happened. The analysis is then used to identify 
areas for change, recommendations and sustainable solutions, to help minimise the re-occurrence 
of the incident type in the future. Alongside the introduction of the root cause analysis training and 
a CD ROM, a modular online training programme with support material was available for NHS staff 
unable to attend the training workshops.
June 2003 Patient safety induction video – Provides a practical introduction to patient safety and an insight into 
how each staff member responsible for delivering care can contribute to a safer environment. Intended 
for incorporation into staff induction programmes.
November 2003 Seven Steps for Patient Safety – To help NHS organisations to improve patient safety: 1) Build a 
safety culture, 2) Lead and support your staff, 3) Integrate your risk management system, 4) Promote 
reporting, 5) Involve and communicate with patients and the public, 6) Learn and share safety lessons 
and 7) Implement solutions to prevent harm. Accompanied by a checklist for chief executives to 
enable them to plan their activities and measure performance in patient safety.
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May 2004 Incident Decision Tree – A framework for human resource and NHS managers to determine the 
course of action to take with staff who have been involved in a patient safety incident in order to 
encourage a consistent and fair approach to staff issues across the NHS.
June/July 2004 Patient safety e-learning – An introduction to the National Patient Safety Agency’s work and the 
factors that effect patient safety. The modules are: introduction to patient safety; guidance and support; 
reporting; patient safety reporting; team working; infusion devices and misidentification.
July 2004 Safer Handover – Provides guidance to doctors on best practice and examples of good models for 
safer patient handover.
March 2005 Hospital at Night – Patient Safety Risk Assessment Guide – Provides an approach to risk assess 
Hospital at Night solutions to ensure their design and implementation leads to safer patient care.
Reports
February 2004 Listening to people with Learning Disabilities – Five key risks identified from the experiences of 
people with learning disabilities and their carers across England and Wales, feedback from health 
and social care professionals and a literature review around existing work: 1) control and restraint, 
2) vulnerability of people with learning disability in general hospitals, 3) swallowing difficulties, 
4) lack of accessible information and 5) illness or diseases being mis- or un-diagnosed.
December 2004 Right patient, right care – Patients can receive healthcare which is not intended for them or be 
matched with specimens other than their own. Proposed a way forward with the NHS, industry and 
patients working together to devise and introduce systems which will help to reduce mismatching 
significantly and make patient care safer.
Reporting Mechanisms
September 2004 Online incident reporting form (e-Form) – For all NHS staff who want to report (anonymously) to the 
National Patient Safety Agency, rather than through their trust. Fully functional January 2005.
December 2004  National Reporting and Learning System – System designed to link to local incident reporting systems 
to receive patient safety incident reports. All trusts were to begin sending data in June 2005 (at least 
35 have not yet submitted data). 
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Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts 
The Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts is a risk pooling scheme in respect of clinical claims 
administered by the NHS Litigation Authority. Contained within the scheme are a number of clinical 
risk management standards to encourage trusts to promote good risk management practices and 
reduce the number and value of clinical claims.
General Clinical Risk Management Standards:  
Standard one, learning from experience (April 2004)
Level 1 1  Patient adverse incidents and near misses reported in 50 per cent of  
all specialties
 2  Summarised patient incident reports are provided regularly to relevant bodies 
for review and action
Level 2 1 Clinically related events are reported as they occur and before claims are made
 2  There is evidence of management action arising from patient safety  
incident reporting
 3  Patient adverse incidents and near misses are reported in 100 per cent of  
all specialties
 4  In the interest of patient safety, openness and constructive criticism of clinical 
care is actively encouraged
 5  Examples of two changes which reduce risk as a consequence of complaints 
can be demonstrated
 6 The Trust applies the advice in the National Confidential Enquiries
Level 3 1 All clinical staff receive training in patient adverse incident reporting
 2  Examples of five changes which reduce risk as a consequence of complaints 
can be demonstrated
Maternity Clinical Risk Management Standards:  
Standard two, learning from experience (April 2004)
Level 1 1  A system is in place for reporting adverse incidents and near misses in all areas 
of service
  2 The incident report form gathers significant data about the event
  3  The incident report form contains clear guidance on its completion and any 
subsequent action required
APPENDIX 7
Measuring Risk Management and Performance 
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  4  Summarised adverse incident reports are provided regularly to the Maternity 
Services Risk Management Group for review and action
  5  The service implements the trust policy on the relationship between incident 
reporting and disciplinary action
Level 2 1  The service has a strategic approach to the management of adverse incidents 
that might lead to a claim or litigation
  2  There is evidence of lessons learned and action arising from adverse  
incident reporting
  3  The service applies the board approved trust policy for managing serious 
untoward incidents
  4  The service can demonstrate changes in practice which reduce risk, in response 
to complaints
  5 All professional staff receive guidance and training in adverse incident reporting
  6  The service considers and applies the recommendations made in the National 
Confidential Enquiries
Level 3 1  The service audits its practice against the advice in the National Confidential 
Enquiries, and implements changes accordingly
Risk Pooling Schemes for Trusts 
The Liabilities to Third Parties Scheme was established in 1999, to provide a means for NHS trusts 
to fund the cost of non-clinical legal liabilities to third parties and to encourage and support the 
effective management of risk and claims. The Risk Pooling Schemes for Trusts which supported the 
non-clinical risk pooling scheme and assessed NHS bodies’ general approach to risk management 
was withdrawn at the end of March 2005, but key elements of the Standard will be incorporated 
into the revised approach to NHS Litigation Authority standards and assessments. 
Criterion four:  
Incident reporting and management (all to achieve Level one) (April 2004)
1 There is a Board approved policy/procedure for recording, reporting and managing incidents
2 The policy/procedure is based upon a standard definition of incidents
3 The policy/procedure promotes a positive and fair blame approach towards incident reporting
4  All reported incidents and causal factors are classified and categorised in accordance with a 
standardised classification scheme
5  The policy/procedure states that all incidents must be reported promptly and an incident  
form completed
6  The policy/procedure states that management actions and preventative measures taken must  
be recorded
7  All reported incidents are graded according to severity of outcome and potential future risk to 
patients and/or the organisation
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8  A policy/procedure on incident investigation and root cause analysis is in place that contains a 
clear protocol to be followed
9  For serious adverse incidents that could have an impact upon staff, patients or the public the 
policy/procedure requires them to be advised
10  All incidents are reported on standard forms, which may be paper-based or electronic, and which 
captures a minimum dataset of information in accordance, where relevant with NHS guidance
Standards for Better Health
Core standard – Safety
Patient safety is enhanced by the use of health care processes, working practices and systemic 
activities that prevent or reduce the risk of harm to patients
C1   Health care organisations protect patients through systems that prevent or reduce the risk of 
harm to patients. 
 a)   identify and learn from all patient safety incidents and other reportable incidents, and make 
improvements in practice based on local and national experience and information derived 
from the analysis of incidents; and
 b)  ensure that patient safety notices, alerts and other communications concerning patient 
safety which require action are acted upon within required timescales
C2  Health care organisations protect children by following national child protection guidance 
within their own activities and in their dealings with other organisations
C3   Health care organisations protect patients by following National Institute for Clinical 
Effectiveness interventional procedures guidance
C4   Health care organisations keep patients, staff and visitors safe by having systems to ensure that:
 a)   the risk of health care acquired infection to patients is reduced, with particular emphasis on 
high standards of hygiene and cleanliness, achieving year-on-year reductions in MRSA;
 b)  all risks associated with the acquisition and use of medical devices are minimised;
 c)   all reusable medical devices are properly decontaminated prior to use and that the risks 
associated with decontamination facilities and processes are well managed;
 d)  medicines are handled safely and securely; and
 e)   the prevention, segregation, handling, transport and disposal of waste is properly managed 
so as to minimise the risks to the health and safety of staff, patients, the public and the safety 
of the environment
Developmental standard
D1   Health care organisations continuously and systematically review and improve all aspects 
of their activities that directly affect patient safety and apply best practice in assessing and 
managing risks to patients, staff and others, particularly when patients move from the care of 
one organisation to another
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Components of a safety culture have been defined as:
n Commitment to safety articulated at the highest level 
n Safety is perceived to be the highest priority
n Financial investment is made in safety practice 
n Incentives are aligned to promote safe practice
n Open communication around safety issues is encouraged 
n Unsafe acts are rare
n Commitment to organisational learning rather than blame
n	 Organisations are proactive not reactive
appendix seven
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GLOSSARY


















General Medical Council 
 
Harm
Hospitals, which are managed by their own Boards and which provide beds on the 
following wards: intensive care, terminally ill/palliative care, surgical, medical and 
paediatric, acute maternity and acute elderly and young physically disabled.
Harm resulting from medical intervention related to a drug.
Unintended injuries caused by medical management rather than the disease process.
A review by the Department of the work undertaken by the stand alone national 
organisations it sponsors to undertake its executive functions, carried out in 2004.
An organisational culture which inhibits openness regarding reporting incidents as staff 
are fearful of being personally penalised for making errors.
Organised review of current clinical procedures compared with pre-determined 
standards. Action is then taken to rectify any identified deficiencies in current 
practices. The review is repeated to see if the standards are being met.
A framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by 
creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish.
Reviews carried out by the Commission for Health Improvement to evaluate trust 
structures that assess the quality of their services and safeguard high standards of care.
Incidents in a health care setting caused by clinical procedures that resulted, or could 
have resulted, in unexpected harm to the patient.
Staff who work for a company which is employed by an NHS trust to carry out work 
for them, for example contract cleaners. They take instructions from a manager who 
also works for the contractor, not from trust employees themselves.
The system of management which informs NHS boards about identified risks and help 
determine unacceptable levels of risk. Chief executives and boards can then decide 
where best to direct resources to eliminate or reduce those significant risks within  
their organisation.
Trusts that are responsible for their own financial management and are performance 
managed by primary care trusts.
All practising doctors must be registered with the General Medical Council. It protects 
the interests of patients via legal powers designed to maintain the standards the public 
have a right to expect of doctors.
Death, disease, injury, suffering and/or disability experienced by a person.
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Health and Safety Executive 
 








Integrated risk management 
 
 






Medical Protection Society 
Medication error 
 
A statutory body, which reports to the Health and Safety Commission, with day-to-day 
responsibility for making arrangements for the enforcement of safety legislation to 
ensure that risks to health and safety due to work activities are properly controlled.
Independent body that protects the health and well-being of the population of the 
United Kingdom, particularly with regard to infectious diseases, chemical hazards, 
poisons and radiation.
Promotes improvement in the quality of the NHS and independent healthcare. Has 
a statutory duty to assess performance of healthcare organisations, awarding annual 
ratings for the NHS, and co-ordinate inspections and reviews of healthcare.
An infection that was neither present nor incubating at the time of a patient’s 
admission which normally manifests itself more than three nights after the patient’s 
admission to hospital.
A full investigation into the causes of a patient safety incident, though not necessarily 
using root cause analysis techniques.
A visit carried out as part of a review, investigation or study to inspect premises or 
documents, or to require explanation.
The process of identification, assessment, analysis and management of all risks and 
incidents for every level of the organisation, and aggregating the results at a corporate 
level, which facilitates priority-setting and improved decision-making to reach optimal 
balance of risk, benefit and cost.
A trust’s own system for the reporting and logging of patient safety incidents and  
near misses.
The path by which important corporate messages are communicated from trust board 
level down to the operational staff.
Any instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or health care product, excluding 
drugs, used for a patient or client for the purpose of: 
n diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease or an injury 
or handicap
n investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a  
physiological process
n control of conception.
An adverse event or near miss that is preventable with the current state of  
medical knowledge.
A mutual medical protection organisation to assist doctors with the legal problems that 
arise from their professional practice.
Any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or 
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the healthcare professional, 
patient or customer.
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Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency  
 











NHS Litigation Authority  
 
NHS Clinical Governance 
Support Team 
National Institute for  






National NHS Staff  
Survey 2004 
Executive agency of the Department of Health and Competent Authority that ensures 
medicines and medical equipment meet appropriate standards of safety, quality, 
performance and effectiveness. The legislation covers neither the prescribing or 
administration of drugs nor the user of the device or the environment in which it is used.
Body to protect the rights of mentally ill patients detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983. Receives notification of the deaths of detained patients and reviews all deaths 
from unnatural causes and provides expert advice and guidance to the Department, 
providers and professionals.
The state of having a disease, or reduced state of health.
Death.
A special health authority to provide a support service to health authorities, primary 
care trusts and hospital and community trusts that are faced with concerns over the 
performance of an individual doctor. Following the Arm’s Length Bodies Review, it 
became part of the National Patient Safety Agency and was renamed the National 
Clinical Assessment Service.
Produces estates and facilities alerts and guidance on land, property, equipment and 
facilities issues. Following the Arm’s Length Bodies Review this responsibility has 
transferred to the Department.
Special health authority responsible for handling negligence claims made against NHS 
bodies in England. In addition to dealing with claims when they arise, it has an active 
risk management programme to help raise standards of care in the NHS.
Provides practical support to help trusts implement clinical governance through 
development programmes, disseminating lessons from development work across the 
country and answering trusts’ clinical governance questions.
An independent organisation responsible for providing national guidance on 
the promotion of good health and the prevention and treatment of ill health. On 
1st April 2005, it joined with the Health Development Agency to become the new 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Produces three kinds of guidance: 
n technology appraisals – the use of new and existing medicines and treatments 
within the NHS in England and Wales 
n clinical guidelines – appropriate treatment and care of people with specific 
diseases and conditions within the NHS in England and Wales 
n interventional procedures – whether those used for diagnosis or treatment  
are safe enough and work well enough for routine use in England, Wales  
and Scotland.
Between October and December 2004, over 217,000 staff in 572 NHS trusts and 
26 strategic health authorities in England took part in the second National NHS Staff 
Survey, conducted by the Healthcare Commission.
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National Programme for 
Information Technology  




National Service Frameworks 
 
Near miss  
Non-clinical incident 
Patient Advice and  
Liaison Service 
 
Patient Safety Observatory 
 
Patient safety incident 
 
Patient safety incident 
(prevented)







From 1 April 2005, after the Arm’s Length Bodies Review, the Department’s agency, 
NHS Connecting for Health is delivering the National Programme. Over the next  
ten years, over 30,000 general practitioners in England are expected to connect 
to almost 300 hospitals and give patients access to their personal health and care 
information. New systems, such as Electronic Patient Record, Choose and Book 
electronic appointment booking, and Prescription Transmission, will be implemented 
to improve patient experience of the NHS.
One of a range of measures to raise quality and decrease variations in service.  
They are long term strategies which: 
n set national standards and identify key interventions for a defined service or  
care group 
n put in place strategies to support implementation 
n establish ways to ensure progress within an agreed time scale.
Unexpected or unplanned events in the provision of care that could have, but did not, 
lead to harm, loss or damage.
Incidents in a health care setting not caused by clinical procedures that resulted, or 
could have resulted, in unexpected harm to the patient, for example a patient fall.
Available in every trust to provide: 
n confidential advice and support to patients, families and their carers 
n information on the NHS and health related matters 
n confidential assistance in resolving problems and concerns quickly 
n information on and explanations of NHS complaints procedures.
Its staff draw together information from different sources in new ways to quantify, 
characterise and prioritise patient safety issues and thus drive the work programme of 
the National Patient Safety Agency.
Defined by the National Patient Agency as: any unintended or unexpected  
incident that could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving  
NHS-funded healthcare.
The National Patient Safety Agency’s term to describe a near miss. 
Receives a budget directly from the Department to provide primary care (general 
practitioner and local community services) and to commission secondary and tertiary 
care services.
The chance of something happening that will have an impact on individuals and/or 
organisations. It is measured in terms of likelihood and consequence.
The process that helps organisations understand the range of risks they face – both 
internally and externally, the level of ability to control these risks, their likelihood of 
recurrence and their potential impacts. It involves a mixture of quantifying risks and 
using judgement, assessing and balancing of risks and their benefits and weighing 
them, for example, against the cost.
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Serious Hazards  









Strategic health authorities 





A database where results of all an organisation’s risk assessments are collated.
Systematic process whereby factors that contributed to an incident are identified.
A state in which risk has been reduced to an acceptable level.
Information on serious patient safety incidents involving transfusion of blood or 
blood components from participating bodies is collected to: improve the safety of the 
transfusion process; inform policy within the Transfusion Services; improve standards 
of hospital transfusion practice; aid production of clinical guidelines for the use of 
blood components. Participation in the scheme is voluntary, but it covers both NHS 
and private hospitals in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
No single definition but in general it is an event that causes or has the potential to 
cause serious injury, mental trauma, and unexpected death or where there could 
be police involvement, major litigation and/or media interest. Reported to the local 
strategic health authority via the Strategic Executive Information System.
Responsible for the performance of the local NHS and for setting strategies within 
which the national framework set out by the Department can be achieved.
A confirmation that the effectiveness of the system of internal control has been 
reviewed and that the Accounting Officer, the Board and the Audit Committee of the 
organisation have discussed the results. Produced with a high-level summary of the 
processes to identify, evaluate and control risk and training for staff to manage risk.
System for naming and organising items into groups that share similar characteristics.
Staff who are employed by an agency or by the trust directly to work for it for a limited 
period of time. When at the trust they take instructions from trust employees, for 
example agency nurses and locum doctors.
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